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Abstract
(Note: this is a substantially revised version of Harvard Olin Working Paper # 415 of May
2003, SSRN Abstract ID # 392202, and includes more detailed discussion of issues including
the DOE, willfulness and the Knorr decision, and the FTC Report on patents and antitrust).
Critics of the patent system suggest the rules for determining patentability should be
stricter, subjecting patents to more scrutiny during Patent Office examination. This Article
offers a counterintuitive model system under which patent applications are registered, not
examined, to elucidate a new normative view that sees present positive law rules for
obtaining patents as primarily operating to minimize social cost, and that accounts for
otherwise puzzling aspects of the patent system. This “registration” theory for patentobtaining rules is a companion to the “commercialization” theory for patent-enforcing rules
by the same author. This Article shows how these theories together offer a more coherent
view of the patent system than the “reward,” “prospect,” and “rent dissipation” theories.
This Article further identifies those patentability rules that are essential and those that
should be reformed, while revealing inherent registration aspects of our present system and
reasons for eschewing reforms presented elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION
Allowing an Internet shopper, who is a regular customer of a web site, to
complete her selected purchase without having to click a confirmatory button
indicating she really meant to buy it may hardly seem like something a wellfunctioning patent office should have found appropriate for patent protection in
1997.1 Yet, a federal court issued a preliminary injunction to enforce such a patent
against Barnesandnoble.com during the 1999 Christmas season, requiring
customers to make two or more clicks to complete purchases on that site—a

1

But see U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) (entitled “Method and System
for Placing a Purchase Order via a Communications Network,” listing Jeff Bezos and others as
inventors and assigned to Amazon.com, Inc., which covers what is colloquially called “one-click
shopping,” the application for which was filed on September 12, 1997).
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potential annoyance to them and a cause of lost revenue for the company.2
Although the preliminary injunction was eventually vacated on appeal based on
the questionable validity of the patent in view of the prior art,3 the defendant’s
litigation costs to obtain this result could not have been minor.4
The threat of cases like this has prompted the Federal Trade Commission
and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division to ask in their announcement of
joint hearings on such issues:
To what extent do questions about the scope and types of patents (e.g.,
business methods patents), and the procedures and criteria under which they are
issued, raise competition issues? To what extent do substantive and procedural
rules, both at agency and judicial levels, have implications for initial and
sequential innovation, competition, and appropriability?5

The hearings that followed this announcement spanned most of 2001, during
which many critics of the patent system argued that the system may be in steep
decline due to an increase in the number of patents issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (the “Patent Office”) that these critics suggest do not meet the

2

Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1249 (W.D.
Wash. 1999) (granting motion for preliminary injunction on December 1), vacated and remanded
by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
3

Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1342, 1366 (2001) (vacating
and remanding because of “substantial questions as to the validity of the ’411 patent”).
4

The published order of the trial court lists thirteen different attorneys on the side of the
defendant. Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. The case was filed on October 21, 1999, and the
preliminary injunction was entered roughly seven weeks later, after expedited discovery including
depositions and five days of oral arguments. Given the emergent need to handle so many tasks in
such a case, it fairly may be assumed that the listed attorneys were billing most, say two-thirds, of
their time on the case while working most of the time, say twelve-hour days six days a week. At a
blended rate of $250 per hour, this suggests the total legal fees through the entry of the
preliminary injunction were over one million dollars ($1,092,000). The fees through the appeal are
likely to have been at least another one million dollars, based on similar calculations. See Am.
Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of Economics Survey 2001, at 88–89 tbl.22 (2001) (reporting
the median total cost of litigation including discovery, motion practice, trial, and appeal to be $1.5
million or $2.9 million, depending upon whether the amount at stake in the lawsuit was either
from $1–$25 million or greater than $25 million).
5

Notice of Public Hearings Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,146, 58,147 (Nov. 20, 2001) (announcing joint
hearings and explaining the reasons for them); see also Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
Muris Announces Plans for Intellectual Property Hearings (Nov. 15, 2001) (collecting sources,
including links to Federal Register Notice and to speech by Chairman Timothy Muris, and
questioning
these
and
other
aspects
of
the
patent
system),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/11/iprelease.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
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proper patentability standards and, as a result, are too broad or too narrow, unduly
tax and retard negotiations, or frustrate competition.6
Although a ratcheting up of the screening done in the first instance by the
Patent Office, to achieve a more “hard-look” examination, is an intuitive and
often-urged response, this Article makes the counterintuitive suggestion that
instead, the Patent Office should do a “soft-look” examination, if any examination

6

For a schedule of the hearings including participants and topics, see http://www.
ftc.gov/opp/intellect/detailsandparticipants.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). For a collection of
academic and popular literature making these criticisms, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001).
Although many see only broad scope as a potential problem because the patent right to
exclude may be seen as extending too far, others see a couple of problems associated with
narrowness. First, the work by Rebecca Eisenberg and others points out how too many patents of
too narrow scope can be seen to unduly tax and retard transactions. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77,
126–29 (1999) (suggesting that patents on multiple gene fragments, such as expressed sequence
tags, could block the use of a larger DNA sequence of which they are a part, and citing Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 Science 698, 699 (1998) (arguing that patents can deter innovation in the field of
basic biological research)). This argument and its implications are explored in depth in the other
important works by Eisenberg. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 (1989) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Experimental Use] (exploring an experimental use exemption from patent infringement
as a device for alleviating potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field
of basic biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Property Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale. L.J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Norms of Science]
(exploring potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic
biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Public Research] (offering preliminary observations about the empirical
record of the use of patents in the field of basic biological research and recommending a retreat
from present government policies of promoting patents in that field). But see F. Scott Kieff,
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A
Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 691, 699–700 (2001) (showing why a patent
claim directed to a gene fragment like an expressed sequence tag (“EST”) cannot be construed to
cover a larger DNA sequence, such as a substantial portion of an entire gene); John P. Walsh et al.,
Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation 1 (2002) (working paper,
available online at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/retrievePDF? id=2003-2) (report of
empirical research finding little in the way of anticommons problems with biotech research tools).
Second, the work by Robin Jacob and others point out how claims of narrow scope may be
enforced in ways that avoid significant antitrust scrutiny. Robin Jacob, Side Bar: Objectionable
Narrowness of Claim, in Donald S. Chisum, Craig A. Nard, Herbert F. Schwartz, Pauline
Newman, & F. Scott Kieff, Principles of Patent Law 1097–99 (2d ed. 2001) (providing examples
and collecting sources of early arguments supporting pro-competitive aspects of narrow claims).
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at all.7 This Article focuses on a comparative analysis because the question any
evaluator must always ask is not whether any one system has negative aspects, but
rather how it compares to alternatives.8
To best understand the intuition behind soft-look systems generally, this
Article offers as a model a hypothetical alternative system under which patent
applications are registered, not examined.9 Study of this model reveals both how
the social costs associated with hard-look examination systems are especially
large and how the costs associated with soft-look systems—such as the present
system and the model registration system—are especially small.10
In focusing on social cost, this Article offers a new normative account of
the positive law rules for obtaining patents.11 The registration theory offered in
this Article shows how the essential patentability rules mitigate significant social
costs and how existing normative views of the patent system fail to account for
these social costs.12 Far from defending the present patent system, this Article
offers a number of significant modifications expected to mitigate social costs
further by embracing, somewhat counterintuitively, the admittedly expensive
tools of commercial litigation.13
In the final analysis, the prescriptive conclusions this Article reaches are
somewhat modest.14 Although the conclusions of this Article are limited in part
because they are likely to turn on empirical determinations and balancing that
cannot be done responsibly without further data, this Article does provide a new

7

The “hard-look” and “soft-look” terminology refers to the level of scrutiny given a
patent upon filing. Although at least some patents should get a hard look at some point, this
Article shows how the social costs associated with providing a hard look through civil litigation
are expected to be less, especially when accompanied by the other important features of the patent
system discussed infra in Part IV.
8

See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1,
1 (1969) (critiquing so-called nirvana approaches in favor of comparative institutional
approaches).
9

See infra Part II.

10

See infra Parts III–IV.

11

The Article thereby builds on earlier work by the present author that offers a normative
account of the rules for enforcing patents. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697 (2001).
12

See infra Parts I–IV.

13

See infra Part IV.

14

See infra Part IV.
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and practicable framework for making such evaluations.15 In addition, although
we already may be operating under a de facto soft-look system, at least in many
respects, this Article offers several reforms designed to bring the present system
more in line with soft-look systems like the proposed registration model.16
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn here may be influenced by our broader views
on the comparative strengths of different decision-making regimes, such as
between those that are centralized and those that are individualized and dispersed,
and between those based on rules and those based on standards.17 Regardless of
the prescriptive value any of this Article’s conclusions may have for positive
patent law directly, this Article’s unique elucidation of a normative account of the
patent-obtaining rules as operating to minimize certain social costs will help
commentators and policymakers evaluate other proposed reforms in the future.18
This Article proceeds in four parts as follows: Part I reviews the existing
normative theories of the patent system and shows how they fail to offer
practicable approaches for a positive law regime and fail to minimize social
costs.19 Part II explores the case for an alternative hypothetical model of a
registration system and shows how social costs can be minimized by use of such a
15

As discussed infra in Parts I–IV, the registration theory’s ease of implementation is one
of the theory’s important comparative benefits over other theories of the patent system, such as the
“prospect” and “rent dissipation” theories.
16

See infra Part IV.

17

For a discussion of the broader debate between legal systems based on rules and those
based on standards, see generally Mark Kelman, A Guide To Critical Legal Studies 15–63 (1987)
(describing basic framework of the debate and collecting sources); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992) (exploring the costs implicated by the
choice between rules and standards and showing: rules typically are more costly than standards to
create; standards typically are more costly for individuals to interpret, both by individuals deciding
how to act under them and by government decisionmakers deciding how to apply them; and
individuals are more likely to act in accordance with the goals of rules as long as the individuals can
determine how they will be applied); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:
Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000) (reviewing more recent literature and
collecting sources). Compare Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 100 (1988)
(arguing that private bargaining over the allocation of the legal entitlement may be more efficient if
the entitlement is clearly defined and assigned ex ante according to a rule, rather than made ex post
by a judge applying a standard), with Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus
Standards, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 256–59 (1995) (showing how parties may negotiate with each
other under both types of regimes and arguing that in certain two-party cases, bargaining may be
more efficient under a standard than under a rule).
18

As discussed infra Parts I–IV, the registration theory’s explanatory power for the present
patent system is another of the theory’s important comparative benefits over other theories of the
patent system, such as the “reward,” “prospect,” and “rent dissipation” theories.
19

See infra notes 23–65 and accompanying text.
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system.20 Part III reviews the law and economics of the core patent-obtaining
rules and shows how the registration theory is superior to other normative
theories, both in ability to be implemented and in ability to account for the patentobtaining rules in the present system.21 Part IV compares the pure registration
model to the present system and then offers some proposed reforms to the present
system.22

I. CONTEXT WITHIN THE PATENT LAW & ECONOMICS LITERATURE
Prevailing normative views of the patent system fail to account for
significant social costs that are mitigated by many of the present patentability
rules.23 Although the prevailing views do provide important lessons about how the
patent system can mitigate certain social costs, they fail to show, in any practical
way, how to mitigate others, or how to mitigate social cost overall. More
specifically, they fail to address important issues such as how to evaluate an
invention, either to determine its entitlement to some patent or other reward, or to
determine its relative entitlement when compared with other inventions.24 These
issues turn out not to be small administrative matters.25 The normative view
offered in this Article shows how the present patent system has evolved essential
tools for making these determinations in ways that mitigate social cost.26
The patent system in this country has generally been seen as offering
inventors an incentive to do something they might not otherwise do—for
example, invent, disclose, commercialize, or design around.27 These incentives
are generated by the grant in each patent of the right to exclude others from doing
whatever is covered by the patent’s claims.28 Recognizing that discrete incentives
20

See infra notes 66–84 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 85–222 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 223–291 and accompanying text.

23

See infra Part III, elucidating the law and economics of the core patent-obtaining rules
and showing how the registration theory dominates other normative theories both in ability to be
implemented and in ability to account for the patent-obtaining rules in the present system.
24

See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.

25

See infra Part III, showing how these issues are addressed by the present patentobtaining rules.
26

See infra Part III.

27

For a review of the literature and a collection of sources, see Chisum et al., supra note
6, at 58–90 (reviewing various incentive theories for the patent system) and Eisenberg,
Experimental Use, supra note 6, at 1024–46 (same).
28

Patents give only a right to exclude use of whatever product or process is covered by
the patent’s claim or claims. Thus, for example, patents do not interfere with other governmental
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like these, focused on inventors, could be provided directly without the outputrestricting effects of the patent right to exclude, commentators have for over a
century explored alternative ways to provide these incentives using tools such as
cash rewards and tax credits.29
In his 1977 piece on the so-called prospect theory of the patent system,
which builds upon work by Yoram Barzel and others, Edmund Kitch showed how
granting formal property rights, as opposed to cash rewards, is important for
avoiding the social costs associated with racing towards a common prize.30 Called
rent dissipation by Mark Grady and Jay Alexander in 1992,31 the racing problem
can be demonstrated by the example of an uncoordinated group of individuals
who are each seeking a prize of known value. Each such individual might
rationally elect to spend up to just less than the value of the prize to get it,
meaning that as a group they are spending more in aggregate than the value of the
prize.32
efforts to restrict use, such as to mitigate environmental impact. See F. Scott Kieff, Patents for
Environmentalists, 9 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 307, 308 (2002) (invited symposium piece for
National Association of Environmental Law Societies annual meeting entitled “Sustainable
Agriculture: Food for the Future,” held March 15–17, 2002, at Washington University School of
Law) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . .
of the right to exclude others . . . .”)).
29

Generally, prizes or rewards are thought to offer two main benefits over patents: (1)
they do not confer power over price; and (2) they can be made later in time, after the demand
curves are knowable, so a more precise calculation of the social benefit of the invention can be
determined and then used when setting the reward amount. For a detailed review of the history and
modern iterations of prize proposals, including a new improvement thereon, see generally Michael
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 115 (2003) (collecting sources and
arguing for the establishment of an agency to distribute a fund for rewarding corporate efforts to
reduce the monopoly effects of patent rights). Determining how to administer rewards in the real
world is a central problem the commercialization theory identifies in reward proposals, as well as
any reward-based theory of patents. See Kieff, supra note 11, at 712–17 (discussing this problem
in the context of the screening advantages of patents over rewards). Reward approaches and
theories usually assume a one-to-one relationship between inventions and markets that can
drastically deviate from reality—consider that the typical car or computer sold in a single market
comprises a huge bundle of patent and other intellectual property rights. In addition, reward
approaches do not elucidate how to determine what should be rewarded and how to allocate
rewards among claimants.
30

Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ.
265, 265–67 (1977) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev. Econ. & Stat.
348 (1968)).
31

Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev.
305, 305–10 (1992).
32

Consider a case in which the value of the prize is X and the group of individuals is Y in
number. Each individual might rationally elect to spend up to just less than X to obtain the prize,
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Although rent dissipation can be a problem in theory, recent work by
Michael Abramowicz adroitly points out a number of factors that may mitigate
rent dissipation effects in practice.33 These factors include risk aversion;
opportunity costs; diversity among those racing; the time it takes to get the
reward; and externalized costs or benefits those racing impose on others, such as
the income to those who sell goods and services needed by those racing or the
costs to those who are bothered by the activities associated with racing.34
In addition, rent dissipation presumes there is a single prize, or at least a
discrete number of prizes.35 But those attempting to solve a problem may not
say some amount equal to X minus a small discount, say , or (X- ). Yet, if all individuals spend
that amount, then the community has spent the amount equal to [(X- ) x Y] to obtain something
worth only X. The following mathematical representation will be true as long as X and Y are
numbers greater than one and d is a number less than one:
[(X- ) x Y] > Y
This means that the amount society spent to obtain the prize is greater than the amount
society got by obtaining the prize, which would be a waste of resources. To be sure, whether each
individual would rationally elect to spend up to just less than X depends on a number of factors.
See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 232 (1989); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill,
Privatizing the Commmons: An Improvement?, 50 S. Econ. J. 438, 441, 447 (1983). For a
somewhat similar critique of the rent dissipation theory, see A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified
Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 267, 284–85
(1996).
33

Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy 10–18 (George Mason Sch. of Law,
Law & Econ., Working Paper Series 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=374580 (collecting sources and showing how each of these factors may operate to
mitigate rent dissipation effects).
34

Id. at 11–12. A more palpable, albeit mythological, example of these positive
externalities of racing might include the joy children experience when they drink the Tang® and
use the Velcro® that many think were brought to society through the NASA-sponsored space race;
the corresponding negative externalities might include the cavities some children get from
increased exposure to this sugared drink and their difficulty tying knots after growing up with
shoes kept on by hook-and-loop fasteners instead of laces. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier
Case for Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 351, 378
n.95 (1993):
The creation of “spin off” inventions has often been urged as one of the benefits of governmentfunded research. See George J. Howick, The NASA Technology Utilization Program, in Utilizing R &
D By-Products 69, 78–82 (Jerome W. Blood ed., 1967) (describing NASA program and examples of
spin-off inventions, including inorganic paint, walking wheel chair, maintenance-free lubricated
bearings, and sight-controlled switches). Some other examples of commercial products arising out of
the space program include, smoke detectors, graphite, an artificial pancreas, heated ski goggles and
hang gliders, but not velcro, teflon or tang.
35

Although it is often useful when modeling a problem to reduce it to a manageable form
to construct the model, the single-solution element of the rent-seeking models cannot be
extrapolated to provide meaningful guidance for policymakers without at least consideration of
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arrive at the same solution; they may get to different solutions and there may be
even more solutions available.36 Although multiple solutions to a given problem
may be wasteful when the good is not really needed, which is an interesting
possibility explored at some length by Abramowicz,37 when the utility of the good
is substantial, the benefits of multiple solutions may dominate.38 That is, although
more may not always be better, it also may not always be worse. Consider the
multiple, independently patentable and non-infringing solutions to the problem of
pain and inflammation: aspirin, acetaminophen (Tylenol®), ibuprofen (Advil®,
Motrin®), selective COX-2 inhibitors (Vioxx® and Celebrex®), and various
steroids.39 Some patients can only take some of these drugs, and some patients
can take all, but not at all times. In the real world we cannot know ex ante
whether more solutions are going to be redundant, or whether they will both

whether in the real world the set of possible solutions to a given problem (prizes) is limited, and
whether we are nearing such a limit.
36

See infra note 39 and accompanying text.

37

Abramowicz, supra note 33, at 2–9. Interestingly, the fair use defense and the utility
exception to copyrightable subject matter may combine to leave uses that are needed effectively
beyond the enforceable reach of any valid copyright rights.
38

An increase in the number of available solutions will increase the chance of each
person gaining access to any one solution. This is one reason why the patent system does not
require the claimed invention to be “better” than the prior art, only new and nonobvious. As thenjudge Warren Burger wrote, quoting Judge Giles Rich:
Progress is most effectively promoted by protecting those who enrich the art as well as those who
improve it. Even though their inventions are not as good as what really exists, such inventors are not
being rewarded for standing still or for retrogressing, but for having invented something. The system
is not concerned with the individual inventor’s progress but only with what is happening to
technology.

Comm’r of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber-Scheideanstalt, 397 F.2d 656, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(Burger, J.) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 393, 402
(1960), reprinted in Nonobviousness—The Ultimate Condition of Patentability 2:1, 2:9 (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980) (admonishing that we must avoid “the unsound notion that to be patentable
an invention must be better than the prior art.”).
39

It is not always the case that an independently patentable invention will avoid
infringement of earlier patents. Patentability of the second invention turns on a very different set
of questions than its possible infringement of the first patent. The patentability analysis of the
second invention will turn largely on the scope of information in the art at the time that invention
is sought to be patented, which includes the disclosure in the first patent. For more on the rules of
patentability over the prior art, see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 323–706 (treatise and casebook
teaching and collecting sources). The possible analysis of infringement of the first patent by the
second invention will turn on the claims of the first patent. For more on the rules of patent
infringement, see id. at 829–1041.
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increase consumer choice and provide access to more consumers who could not
consume the earlier solutions.40
An additional problem with the prospect and rent dissipation theories is that
they present themselves with the very problem they attempt to solve. As Donald
McFetridge and Douglas Smith pointed out soon after Kitch, the more effective the
patent is in coordinating activities of those in the industry after the patent has
issued,41 the greater will be the problems of racing towards the patent application
before filing.42 Kitch’s response was to argue that the coordination costs are likely
to be low in such early stages because there are likely to be only a small number of
players then.43 But this response does not fully answer the problem. As
Abramowicz correctly points out, the transaction costs may be high in such a
community because the members may have significant cognitive biases.44 The
transaction costs to coordinating may also be high if the racers do not know about
each other.45
But the central limitation of the rent dissipation and prospect theories is
that they do not offer a way to use the social cost lessons of prospecting to design
legal rules for obtaining patents that can operate ex ante to mitigate the social
costs of prospecting. Instead, Kitch argues that the prospect theory explains why
the commercial success associated with a patented invention should be an
important factor in determining whether it is patentable.46
40

In areas where we can make good judgments ex ante about which avenues of research
are most likely to be productive, it may be possible to fund the work prospectively. The
government grant-making processes such as those at NIH and NSF basically operate this way by
empanelling experts in the field to review grant applications.
41

Kitch, supra note 30, at 276.

42

Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & Econ. 197, 202–03 (1980).
43

Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. &
Econ. 205, 205–06 (1980).
44

Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 184 n.251 (collecting sources on cognitive biases of
overconfidence and overoptimism).
45

They may not know each other because the field may be so new that the community of
people working in it is not defined. Or, the potential members of the community may generally be
known, but without the freedom to divulge their work to each other that is given by a patent, they
may not know enough about each other to coordinate. This latter type of coordination problem is
known generally as the Arrow Information Paradox. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and
the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 616–
19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
46

Kitch, supra note 30, at 282–83 (discussing commercial success). Later in the same
work, Kitch may be advocating that the test for patentability over the prior art should merely be
novelty, without nonobviousness. See id. at 284 (“Thus substantial novelty is an economically
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Similarly, the rent dissipation theory urges a finely tuned patent system
that will grant and enforce patents only when the balance of these pre-patent and
post-patent racing costs tips just the right way.47 But the rent dissipation theory
does not provide a framework for making such determinations ex ante, at the time
a private party would decide whether to file a patent application or at the time the
Patent Office would examine it. Instead, it only identifies a select few reported
judicial decisions that, according to the summary accounts of Grady and
Alexander, turn out to be ex post examples of results that may have avoided rent
dissipation.48
In the final analysis, at least to date, the prospect and rent dissipation
theories provide important insights about how the patent system can both increase
and decrease rent dissipation-type social costs. But the theories do not offer a tool
for comparing these costs against other social costs, assessing net social costs, or
doing all of this in a way that would work for making patentability determinations
in a timely fashion.49
The importance of being able to make determinations about patentability
and patent scope around the time of the application has been emphasized recently in
a number of areas of the literature. R. Polk Wagner, in his work on the patent
infringement doctrine called the “doctrine of equivalents,” elucidates the
importance of information-forcing penalty default rules as inducement to potential
patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the patent.50
rational test of patentability.”). Such an argument would accord with the social cost saving
benefits of the registration theory outlined here. See infra Part III.A.
47

See Grady & Alexander, supra note 31, at 322–47 (offering a complicated method for
making patentability determinations using a host of factors, many of which are determined long
after a patent application is filed, such as the importance of the patent in controlling downstream
rent-dissipating effects).
48

Id. at 343–47 (discussing only a few cases in summary). Furthermore, one of the few
cases Grady and Alexander rely upon as illustrative of the rent dissipation theory, General Mills v.
Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967), does not accord with any of the prevailing trends in
the case law over time. An electronic search using the Westlaw® KeyCite® service did not reveal a
single case after 1974 that cited Pillsbury on this issue and further revealed that, if anything, the
case is miscited by a commentator as announcing a per se rule against patents in the field of
culinary arts. See Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or
How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1477, 1482 n.30 (1991)
(“Food items are patentable, but the culinary creativity of chefs is not the type of creativity which
meets the standards for patentability.”).
49
50

See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.

R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 161–67 (2002) (arguing for a shift in focus from the allocation of
liability during infringement (ex post) towards rules that generate incentives both during and
before inventors apply for patents (ex ante) so as to better understand information-forcing default
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In addition, Clarissa Long, in her work on the often overlooked signaling function
of patents, shows how in certain circumstances the information-signaling function
of patents may be even more valuable to the rights holder than the substantive
rights conferred by patent law.51
Similarly, my own earlier work on the commercialization theory of
patents shows how the patent right to exclude operates, as designed, at the
time after inventions are made to help bring such nascent inventions to market
through the process called commercialization.52 According to this view,
patents allow patentees, and the many others with whom they must negotiate,
to achieve commercialization by allowing them to internalize the full benefits
of the subject matter claimed, in keeping with the work by Harold Demsetz on
the emergence of property rights generally.53 Also according to this view,
penalty rules like the limitation on the doctrine of equivalents known as the “doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel,” which holds out the possibility of lost patent scope as an
inducement to potential patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the
patent.).
51

Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 625–28 (2002) (exploring the
signaling function of patents generally, including the potential role of the patent document itself to
convey information that would not be as credible when revealed in other contexts).
52

Kieff, supra note 11, at 707–10 (explaining how the right to exclude use promotes
commercialization by facilitating the social ordering and bargaining around inventions that are
necessary to generate output in the form of information about the invention, a product of the
invention, or a useful embodiment of the invention).
53

Indeed, in addition to the administrability or screening problem discussed supra note
29, another central problem the commercialization theory identifies in the reward theories is the
failure of rewards to achieve commercialization. Id. at 717–18, 727–41 (discussing Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967), and Harold
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & Econ. 293 (1970)). The
commercialization theory may resemble some aspects of the prospect theory. See id. at 707 n.47
(“The incentive to commercialize theory discussed herein is similar in some respects to the
‘prospect’ theory elucidated by Kitch, which views the patent as important in providing incentives
for investment in increasing the value of a patented technology.”) (citing Kitch, supra note 30, at
276–77). But Kitch focused on Barzel’s work and on coordination as a tool to decrease pre-patent
and post-patent rent-seeking, or what can be viewed as overuse of certain resources. See Kitch,
supra note 30, at 265 (citing Barzel, supra note 30). In contradistinction, commercialization
focuses on Demsetz’s work and on coordination as a tool to prevent the underuse of certain
resources. Kieff, supra note 11, at 717–18, 727–41 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz). Although
the earlier literature does suggest some correlation between these works of Kitch and Demsetz, it
merely collects them together, without elucidating their interrelationships and differences. See,
e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management,” 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 497 n.121 (1998) (citing work by Demsetz and noting:
“Similar reasoning underlies Edmund Kitch’s proposed ‘prospect’ approach to patents.”);
Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6, at 1040 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and
noting: “The prospect theory offers a justification for patents that is in keeping with broader
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determinations about the property right must be made early in the
commercialization process for that process to occur.54 Indeed, as pointed out in
this earlier work, the desire to help the commercialization of inventions was a
central motivating factor behind the present patent system, which remains
largely based on the 1952 Patent Act.55
To be sure, the commercialization view of the patent system, as elucidated
thus far, may not be without its problems. First, as Abramowicz exhaustively
explores in at least two of his present projects, there may be ways to modify the
patent right to exclude so that commercialization is still achieved, while at the same
time minimizing potential output-restricting effects of the strong right to exclude.56
Second, as Abramowicz also points out, the commercialization view may be both
over- and under-inclusive.57 Stated differently, the commercialization view as
theories of property rights elaborated by Harold Demsetz . . . .”); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 309 n.108 (1996) (citing work by
Kitch and Demsetz and noting: “For neoclassicists, therefore, intellectual property is less about
creating an artificial scarcity in intellectual creations than about managing the real scarcity in the
other resources that may be employed in using, developing, and marketing intellectual
creations.”); Rai, supra note 6, at 121 n.236 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz but seeing the
underuse problem as “not readily apparent in the context of intellectual property”). At bottom,
whereas the prospect theory can be seen to focus on coordination among competing users of an
invention, the commercialization theory can be seen to focus on coordination among
complementary users.
54

This is because the property right is not serving a reward function or a simple costsubsidization function but rather is serving a coordination function. Kieff, supra note 11, at 712
(“Thus, as compared with a reward system, the patent system may be not only better able to
improve coordination among market players engaged in the invention commercialization process,
it also may be better able to avoid rent dissipation.”) (citing generally Grady & Alexander, supra
note 31).
55

Id. at 736–46 (showing how the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act were motivated by the
commercialization theory).
56

Abramowicz offers some important add-on tools for the patent system that would take
the core rules for obtaining and enforcing patents as given, but at some point during the patent
term buy out the patent right through a carefully crafted system to ensure the right price is paid.
See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 115–27; see also Michael Abramowicz, The Human Genome
Project in Retrospect, in F. Scott Kieff, Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project
231, 249–60 (2003) [hereinafter Perspectives on Properties] (describing and assessing a
retrospective grant system).
57

See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 174. I also thank participants in the Spring 2001
Workshop Series of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the University of
Chicago Law School for raising a similar objection. My response to both begins with a reminder
of the brief discussion of the screening function in the paper on which they were commenting, see
Kieff, supra note 11, at 712–17, and continues with the registration theory presented in this
Article.
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discussed thus far does not fully explain, for example, why the patent system does
not afford protection to help commercialize technologies that do not meet the tests
for patentability, such as novelty, but nevertheless are not being commercialized
presently.58
The commercialization view does offer at least an implicit answer to this
problem when it points out the screening role played by competitors of the
patentee with the help of a court, a role which would have to be played by
government decisionmakers under a reward system.59 Under the
commercialization view, the competitors of the patentee are provided with
incentives to bring information about a patent’s validity to the attention of a
decisionmaker.60 Accordingly, the Barnesandnoble.com case discussed at the
beginning of this Article61 represents one example of the screening function
contemplated by the commercialization view, albeit at a cost that is not
insignificant.62
Although the admittedly significant cost of screening patents through civil
litigation presents a serious obstacle to any theory that embraces a soft-look
approach, especially registration, these costs must be compared against the costs of

58

These might be technologies that have been forgotten, that never managed to draw
sufficient coordinated interest to have been commercialized, or have been commercialized only
outside of this country. Indeed, although so-called “patents of importation” were available for
inventions not previously commercialized in the realm in England and in the colonies before the
country was established, they essentially have not been allowed in this country since its inception.
See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty in Historical Perspective (pts. 1–2), 75 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc’y 689, 777 (1993) (discussing history of the novelty provision in the U.S.
patent system at the time of framing). The law and economics of the novelty provisions in the
present patent system, including the treatment of foreign activity as prior art, are discussed infra
Part III.A.1.
59

Kieff, supra note 11, at 712–17.

60

Id. It appears that Kitch also may have noticed this feature of the patent system in his
reply to McFetridge and Smith:
A patent system is a grant system with the clever feature that it generates private incentives for those
with comparative advantage in the innovating activity to reveal the information necessary to define
the prospect right. Without this incentive, the granting agency would have to determine the
appropriate scope and technological area of the prospect rights with access only to its own
information.

Kitch, supra note 43, at 207 n.5. What is not clear from this text is whether “private parties” refers
to patentees, the patentees’ competitors, or both. As explained in more detail infra in Part III, each
of these players in the patent system plays a crucial role in making sure the patent claim scope is
“just right” in a way that minimizes social costs.
61

See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.

62

See supra note 4 (showing representative costs).
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allocating or screening patents using other approaches.63 As shown more fully
below, by exploring the hypothetical model registration system, the registration
theory offers comparatively practicable and inexpensive tools for screening
patents.64 The registration theory’s emphasis on the notice aspect of the patent
system is in keeping with contemporary theory of property rights, generally.65

II. THE REGISTRATION MODEL
Many patent critics would begin their reform efforts by ratcheting up the
level of scrutiny given to patent applications during Patent Office examination to
avoid the social costs due to those patents that ultimately would be adjudicated
invalid through federal court litigation.66 The registration model, explored more
fully below, shows that the level of scrutiny the Patent Office gives patent
applications should be ratcheted down, because the cost of thorough examination
would be higher than the costs of federal court litigation.67
The hypothetical model patent system differs from our present one in that
patent applications would be merely registered in the Patent Office rather than
examined.68 Under the present system, patent applications are filed in the Patent
Office and examined for compliance with the legal rules for patentability by
technically and legally trained staff of that administrative agency.69 Under the
63

See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing importance of comparative
analysis). The advantages of screening under a soft-look approach, which were identified by the
commercialization theory, bring into question the role of the Patent Office in a way that provides
the impetus for the registration theory explored here. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying
text (citing Kieff, supra note 11, at 712–17). Thus, the registration theory can be seen as a
companion to, or application of, the broader commercialization theory, which motivated the
framing of the present patent system. See supra note 52 (summarizing commercialization theory).
64

See infra Part II for discussion of the registration model itself and infra Parts III–IV for
application of the model to our present patent system, including proposed reforms.
65

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 24–70 (2000) (discussing informationcost theory of property).
66

For sources, see supra note 5 and Lemley, supra note 6, at 1495 n.1.

67

See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text (discussing costs of providing and
evaluating the information needed to determine validity over the prior art).
68

This involves a shift to a soft-look approach that is counter to the suggested shifts in
the literature. For sources arguing for harder look, see supra note 5 and Lemley, supra note 6, at
1495 n.1.
69

The extent to which the Patent Office is like other administrative agencies, and
therefore subject to the body of administrative law, has been a topic of substantial debate over the
past several years in the literature and in the case law. Compare, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking
Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 127, 127–33 (2000) (arguing that
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examination process, also called patent prosecution, the ex parte exchange between
the applicant and the Patent Office examiner typically lasts about three years before
an application that has not been either finally rejected or abandoned issues as a
patent.70 Having been examined, issued patents enjoy a procedural and substantive
presumption of validity, and a party challenging a patent must prove invalidity
under the heightened standard for civil litigation of “clear and convincing
evidence.”71
In the proposed registration model, patent applications would be filed with
the Patent Office but not examined. The Patent Office would maintain original files
and make authentic copies available publicly, perhaps via the web for free, as is
done with the EDGAR system for securities filings at the Securities and Exchange
Commission.72 In addition, the presumption of validity would be eliminated, or at
administrative law doctrines should not apply to patent law), with Craig Allen Nard, Deference,
Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 1415 passim (1995) (arguing that administrative
law doctrines such as “Chevron deference” should be applied to Patent Office decisions). Also
compare Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (holding that contrary to almost a century
of practice, the Administrative Procedures Act’s standard-of-review provisions set forth in 5
U.S.C. § 706 do apply to factual determinations of the Patent Office), with Merck & Co. v.
Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit stated the following:
As we have previously held, the broadest of the [Patent Office]’s rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to “the conduct of
proceedings in the [Patent Office];” it does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue
substantive rules. Because Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive
rulemaking power, the “Final Determination” at issue in this case cannot possibly have the “force and
effect of law.” Thus, the rule of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply.

(footnotes and internal citations omitted) (holding that the Patent Office is not entitled to the
deference given other administrative agencies, which are vested with sufficient power by
Congress, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
70

See, e.g., Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 91–128 (describing examination procedures
under present system).
71

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (presumption of validity).

72

See SEC Filings & Forms (EDGAR), at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited
Nov. 13, 2003). As described on the front SEC web page about EDGAR:
All companies, foreign and domestic, are required to file registration statements, periodic reports, and
other forms electronically through EDGAR. Anyone can access and download this information for
free. Here you’ll find links to a complete list of filings available through EDGAR and instructions for
searching the EDGAR database.

Id. A modest filing fee, say $1,000, might also be used to fund the operation, and to provide some
disincentive against the filing of complete junk. Indeed, regular maintenance fees might also be
required. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 471, 472–75 (2003) (suggesting modest filing and maintenance fees as an efficient
tool for managing a system of copyright registration and potentially infinite copyright term).
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least relaxed, thereby allowing invalidity to be judged under the standard ordinarily
used in civil litigation of “a preponderance of the evidence.”73
Recent work by Mark Lemley sheds some light on the strengths of softlook systems—such as the present system and the proposed registration model—
as compared with hard-look systems in which patents are examined with stricter
scrutiny.74 Lemley shows that “[b]ecause so few patents are ever asserted against
a competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity
determinations in those few cases than to invest additional resources examining
patents that will never be heard from again.”75
Lemley explores one important reason why the making of detailed validity
determinations in litigation instead of in the Patent Office leads to lower net costs
across all patents when he offers the core insight that litigation and its threat
operate to provide important information about society’s level of interest in a
given patent—only those patents that matter receive a hard look.76 But this
information could be provided through other means, perhaps even directly to the
Patent Office, which leaves open the issue of which method of providing this
information is cheapest.77
A more complete exploration of this open issue is therefore required to
understand the many reasons why the costs of providing such information through
litigation are less.78 One advantage of litigation is that, because it comes later, it
allows more information about society’s interest in the patent to accrue, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of error associated with ex ante efforts to predict which
73

Cf. supra note 71 (citing higher presumption of validity under current system).

74

See generally Lemley, supra note 6.

75

Id. at 1497. Merges also makes this argument in Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 594–96 (1999).
76

Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497 (deriving its essential insight from the littleacknowledged fact that the overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even licensed).
77

The screening function identified by the commercialization theory suggests the
registration approach offered here. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text (discussing
genesis of registration theory). For a discussion of strategies for bringing this information to the
Patent Office, instead of to courts, see the discussion infra Part IV.D of systems that employ
strategies that are soft-look/hard-look hybrids through various post-issuance procedures before the
Patent Office.
78

This is the focus of the registration theory, as discussed throughout this Article. For a
discussion of the law and economics of the patent-obtaining rules of the present system and why
they make sense under the registration theory because they are cheap to enforce, see infra Part III.
For a discussion of potential improvements that may further decrease social costs, see infra Part
IV.
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patents should receive close attention.79 Another advantage is that ex post
selection of those patents that turn out to matter raises fewer administrative and
public choice problems than would ex ante efforts because the attention of both
proponents and opponents of a given patent are more likely to be at a peak in later
litigation.80 Decision making through litigation mitigates many of the well-known
problems associated with making award-type decisions.81
This Article makes a radical departure from prior work in the field by
showing how, on an individual-patent basis, the costs of providing the
information needed to decide validity and the costs of “correct” adjudication with
that information are likely to be lower if these determinations are made in
litigation than if they are made in patent examination.82 The intuition for this view
is that the information relating to validity in litigated cases is rarely in the hands
of the government but, rather, is often obtainable by, or in the hands of, a private
party who experiences a strong incentive to bring that information to the attention

79

This is essentially the Lemley insight. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497.

80

A central problem explored in the public choice literature is ensuring the proper timing
of decision making so that those most interested will be able to have their views counted. To be
sure, this analysis must be seen against the background of the extensive literature on public choice
theory. For collections of views and sources, see generally Perspectives on Public Choice (Dennis
C. Mueller ed., 1997); Mueller, supra note 32; Maxwell L. Stearns, Public Choice and Public Law
(1997); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
“Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199 (1988); Dwight R. Lee,
Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 191 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey,
Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to
Constitutional Theory, 74 Va. L. Rev. 471 (1988).
A related concern from the law and economic literature on patents is the importance of
being able to know ex ante or at least early in the life of a patent whether the patent will be valid.
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of ex ante approaches).
But see supra note 56 (discussing the importance of ex post approaches in Abramowicz’s work on
retrospective spending).
81

See Kieff, supra note 11, at 713–14 & n.77 (citing Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion,
Blackmail, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law 200 (1996) and discussing the problems with
allocating cash rewards, tax credits, or any other kind of kudos in comparison to those with
allocating patents and showing why systems of cash rewards or tax credits would be poor
substitutes for a patent system).
82

Whereas the Lemley insight looks to the aggregate cost across all patents, and points
out that most patents turn out not to matter, see Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497, the insight
provided in this Article looks at the cost for each patent that turns out to matter. For a discussion
of the law and economics of the patent-obtaining rules when applied to any one patent, see infra
Part III. These two insights may be combined to reveal the benefits of many of the proposed
reforms discussed infra Parts IV.C–E.
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of a court.83 As discussed more fully below, this information is more cheaply
obtained, provided, and evaluated by private parties, including the patentee and
competitors of the patentee, than by the government.84
83

Kieff, supra note 11, at 712–14 (discussing the role of a patentee’s competitors in
policing the patent system by searching out and bringing to bear the best information regarding a
patent’s validity).
A somewhat similar tool for bringing to bear this information is the bounty system
proposed in John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 305, 340–53. But such bounty systems may not be net
improvements. They may provide some help in cases where the validity-destroying information is
in the hands of someone other than the party seeking to invalidate the patent. But they may not be
needed and raise further problems. To the extent the person having the information is subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts, then that person is subject to the courts’ subpoena power and can be
compelled to produce documents, testimony, or other evidence once uncovered by the party
seeking to invalidate the patent. The creation of a side market for these people to “sell” their
information will frustrate the operation of the present systems that courts have developed for
obtaining such information through third-party discovery. To the extent third-party witness
compensation practices are considered so stingy that they provide a disincentive to these people,
they can be made more flush through modest amendment to the rules of procedure in such cases.
An alternative approach is the effort to create higher incentives for the patent applicant to
bring this information to bear during the patent examination process in the first instance as
suggested in Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 763, 767–70, 787–97 (2002) (building upon and citing the fee-shifting techniques presented in
the early working paper version of this Article, see F. Scott Kieff, Comments Regarding
Competition & Intellectual Property, Summary of Proposed Testimony, at 12–13, at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/harvardlaw.pdf (2001) (last visited Nov.
13, 2003); infra text accompanying notes 280–282, but arguing that they should be used to provide
an incentive for the patent applicant to better inform the patent examination process, which differs
from the argument presented here in that it adheres to the orthodoxy of advocating methods for
improving hard-look examination systems and eschews soft-look approaches like those explored
in this work), and Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
Ignorance in the Patent Office 2–5 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Ill. Law & Econ., Research Paper
Series No. LE03-007, 2003), at http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=410545 (arguing that
Patent Office examination of patent applications, especially better informed examination, is
important in making issued patents more valuable as the objects of licensing deals). But, as
discussed infra Part III.A, the rules relating to patent validity are, and should be, responsive to
information that happens to be not known or easily knowable by the patent applicant. As a result,
heaping added incentives to find this information on the back of the patent applicant is not likely
to be an efficient tool for bringing this information to the attention of decisionmakers. For other
bounty approaches, see Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards
for
Defeating
Patents
7–9
(2003)
(working
paper,
available
online
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=431242) (suggesting cash rewards be granted to those who successfully
defeat the validity of a patent).
Yet another approach is to alter the framework for appellate review of patent cases, as
explored in the recent important work by Rai. See generally Arti K. Rai, Fact, Law, and Policy:
An Allocation-of-Powers Approach to Patent System Reform (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ.,
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III. THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF PATENT-OBTAINING RULES
The benefits of soft-look patent systems, like either the present system or
the proposed registration model, can be seen through the below law and economic
analysis of present patent-obtaining rules. Each major statutory requirement for
patentability is studied, and its social-cost-minimizing qualities elucidated.85 Seen
through this lens, otherwise puzzling aspects of the patent system appear for the
first time to fit within a coherent normative framework, under which the positive
law rules for obtaining patents operate primarily to minimize social cost.86
Not only does the registration theory depart from existing literature by
accounting for the patent-obtaining rules, it also focuses on the verifiable claims of
both a patent applicant and its competitors, instead of primarily on those of the
applicant.87 That is, rather than first asking what scope of protection a patent
applicant “deserves,”88 the registration theory begins with the presumption that the
patentee is entitled to the largest scope of protection that does not actually infringe
the freedom from patent protection that some competitor of the patentee can claim
Research Paper No. 02-20, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-stract_id=335122 (advocating
change in the appellate review process).
84

See infra part III.A (reviewing patent-obtaining rules relating to the prior art, which
turn out to be triggered by information that is in the hands of the specific parties the rules are
designed to protect, not in the hands of the government). Merges makes a somewhat related point
about the advantages private parties have over courts in evaluating information in patent cases in
Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655,
2664–65 (1994) (discussing private parties’ informational advantage in negotiating over an
intellectual property right, which will be based at least in part on the subsidiary question of that
right’s validity).
85

The rules are shown to practicably protect investment-backed expectations and
facilitate ordering around protected territories. See infra Parts III.A–.A.3.
86

The registration theory has explanatory power for the intricacies of these rules, which
are not well explained by other law and economic theories of the patent system, like the prospect
and rent dissipation theories. Those theories merely point out rent-seeking concerns that are
implicated by patents and at best suggest that ex post determinations be made about which patents
turn out to be better at decreasing the rent-seeking type of social cost. See supra notes 30–49.
87

In contradistinction, the claims of the patentee are the focus of so-called “reward”
theories discussed infra notes 105–108.
88

Other law and economics theorists have tried to align the benefit a patent confers on
the patentee on the one hand with the benefit an invention confers on society on the other hand.
See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buy-Outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation passim
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6304, 1997), at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6304 (discussing ways to improve the match between social surplus
of the invention and the amount an inventor will recoup); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele,
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights passim (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6956, 1999), available at http://www.nber. org/papers/w6956 (same).
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legitimately to “deserve,” and provides a framework for judging this type of
desert.89 In putting the burden on the competitor to justify freedom from the patent,
this approach potentially leaves a patentee with what might be viewed as overly
broad protection.90 But the theory also saddles the patentee with a strong incentive
not to seek “too broad” protection and instead to get the scope “just right.”91 Under
this view, as discussed more fully below, the patent-obtaining rules are
comparatively easy-to-administer tools that operate, in the case of the prior art rules,
to protect prior investment by third parties and patentees and, in the case of the
disclosure rules, to facilitate their future investment.92

A. The Prior Art Rules Inexpensively Protect Investment
Patent law’s rules regarding the prior art—the § 10293 and § 10394
requirements that a patentable invention be novel and nonobvious—protect the
investment-backed expectations of both the patentee and its competitors, and they
do so in ways that involve remarkably few administrative costs.95 As discussed
more fully below, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements protect the
investment-backed expectations of those other than the patentee by ensuring that a
patent right to exclude will not extend to anything those in the art are doing
89

The registration theory focuses on those claims that are verifiable, which turns out also
to have strong explanatory power for the intricacies of the patent-obtaining rules relating to the
prior art. See infra Part III.A. The more basic question of whether we should even elect to inject a
patent system into the otherwise freer market is explored generally supra Part I, and the more
specific case for a system of patents as property rights enforced by property rules is discussed in
my earlier work on the commercialization theory as reviewed supra notes 11, 52–55.
90

See supra note 6 (providing sources of criticism).

91

The problem of getting patent scope “just right” has long dominated the literature. See
generally Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6 (arguing for limited scope to protect
competition rather than facilitate coordination); Grady & Alexander, supra note 31 (offering rent
dissipation theory to show how scope can be adjusted to control rent dissipation in both upstream
and downstream research efforts); Kitch, supra note 30 (offering prospect theory to show how
broad scope controls rent dissipation in downstream research efforts); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1000–05 (1997)
(exploring economic impacts of scope); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and
Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75 (1994) (same); Robert
P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
839 (1990) (same). For a discussion of the patentee’s incentives to get scope “just right,” see infra
Part III.C.
92

See infra Parts III.A–B.

93

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (novelty and statutory bars); see also infra Part III.A.1.

94

Id. § 103 (nonobviousness); see also infra Part III.A.2.

95

See infra Parts III.A.1–2 (discussing how these rules account for verifiable investments).
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already or are about to do.96 As also discussed more fully below, the one-year
grace period of the statutory bar protects the investment-backed expectations of
the patentee.97
As Robert Nozick recognized in his watershed libertarian work on the
minimalist state, it is because of patent law’s prior art rules that the patent system
does not run afoul of the Lockean proviso that property rights should leave
enough in society’s commons for those other than the property holder.98 Patent
law achieves this effect by making sure that valid patents leave others free to do
whatever they otherwise were doing.99
The registration theory goes further than the libertarian realization that
patent law can have this minimal effect on the freedom of those other than the
patentee by suggesting that this effect should not be merely a consequence of the
patent system, but a goal.100 The registration theory also adds the goal of
achieving this effect with the lowest administrative cost possible.101 Once these
two relatively modest goals are envisioned, substantial light is shed on the
justification and operation of the many otherwise complex positive law rules
patent law has evolved for determining what counts as being in the prior art and
96

For a discussion of how the rules on novelty and nonobviousness protect these
investments, see infra notes 127–134, 154–182 and accompanying text.
97

For a discussion of the grace period, see infra notes 135–140 and accompanying text.

98

Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia 182 (1974) (noting that a patent does not
deprive others of anything because, but for the act of inventing, the process or thing invented
would not be in use); see also John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 27, in Two
Treatises of Government 265, 288 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)
(property rights are only justified “where there is enough, and as good left in the common for
others”). The philosophy of intellectual property is a broad topic with its own literature. See, e.g.,
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 passim (1993) (exploring the case for the
public’s property interest in being free from intellectual property rights); Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988) (exploring the case for
property rights in intellectual property using the Lockean labor approach); Jeremy Waldron, From
Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 841 passim (1993) (exploring potential liberty restraints associated with intellectual property
rights).
99

Nozick, supra note 98, at 182.

100

This goal is different from the goals of preventing rent-seeking or giving a reward,
which are the goals of the prospect, rent dissipation, and reward theories offered by others.
Compare supra notes 30–49 (discussing prospect and rent dissipation theories), with infra notes
105–108 (discussing reward theories).
101

The prospect, rent dissipation, and reward theories fail to offer any easy way to
implement their goals. Compare supra notes 30–49 (discussing prospect and rent dissipation
theories), with infra notes 105–108 (discussing reward theories).
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what preclusive effects it will have on a patent claim.102 Other patent theories fail
to provide any explanation for core patent-obtaining rules about the prior art, fail
to offer their own workable rules, or yield perverse results.103
Many patent theories try to answer the skeptical question raised about
patents by one of the country’s first luminaries to write about them. Thomas
Jefferson, who as Secretary of State oversaw the administration of the country’s
first patent system,104 felt it important to ask whether each invention was in the first
instance “worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”105 But any
such theory that tries to tie the legitimacy of a patent to the nature of the invention
faces a number of remarkably difficult problems.106 Theories tied to the merit of the
invention face the conceptual problems of requiring some preliminary
determination of how to judge merit in any practicable fashion.107 They also turn
out to have faced serious practical problems concerning their application, as courts
102

See infra Parts III.A.1–4 (discussing operation of these rules).

103

See supra notes 46–49 (prospect and rent dissipation theories do not offer workable
rules); supra note 81, infra notes 106–108 (reward theories do not offer workable rules either).
104

President George Washington signed the Patent Act of 1790 into law on April 10,
1790. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. See Kenneth W. Dobyns, The Patent Office Pony: A
History of the Early Patent Office 21–22 (1994) (reviewing history of the Patent Office and
collecting sources).
105

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in
Jefferson Writings 1286, 1292 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). Interestingly, Jefferson’s views on
patent issues may have been taken substantially out of context by many, including the Supreme
Court:
[T]here is nothing whatever to indicate that the views held by Jefferson were those of the Framers
themselves or those of either the first federal Congresses or the early federal judiciary, or, for that
matter, the general populace. In this regard, the Graham Court completely ignored the rejection by the
second federal Congress of Jefferson’s proposal that a good defense to infringement should be that the
invention “is so unimportant and obvious that it ought not to be the basis of an exclusive right.”

Edward C. Walterscheid, “Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant”: Constitutional
Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. Intell. Prop. L. 291, 325 (2002) (footnotes omitted)
(collecting sources) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966) (consolidated with
Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chem. Co.) and companion
to United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)).
106

Theories like this are generally referred to as “incentive-to-invent” or “reward”
theories. See generally supra notes 27, 81 (collecting sources that review these theories and their
pitfalls).
107

The conceptual problems generally involve a mismatch between any particular metric
of merit and our impressionistic view of the “right” result. For example, if the metric were hard
work, then accidental inventions would not be patentable. If the metric were value of the invention
to society, then determinations cannot be made ex ante. The many conceptual problems associated
with measuring rewards are discussed in the sources cited supra note 81.
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applying these approaches tended to avoid finding that any invention met the
standard.108
Some other patent theories suggest that the patent-obtaining rules should
be adjusted to be sensitive to complex economic factors, like rent dissipation.109
But some of these, like the prospect theory, fail to offer concrete rules usable ex
ante to make determinations of patentability and instead just offer general
guidelines, such as that patent claims can be better if broader.110 Others, like the
rent dissipation theory, offer the perverse recommendation that an invention that
is so far beyond the prior art that it is “optimal” should not be patentable under the
prior art rules because a patent would both cause too much rent dissipation among

108

By the late 1940s, courts would only allow a patent on an invention that they
determined met the self-referential standard of “invention,” a test that had become so overly robust
that Justice Robert Jackson criticized its application in a 1949 dissent: “the only patent that is valid
is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.” Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co.,
335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent—
or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in Patent Procurement and Exploitation (Southwestern
Legal Found. ed., 1963), reprinted in Nonobviousness—The Ultimate Condition of Patentability,
supra note 38, at 1:1, 1:3 (discussing history of the nonobviousness requirement, and its use as a
replacement for the requirement of invention); George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From
Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 437
passim (1999) (same). Even after the requirement for “invention” was statutorily replaced by the
1952 Patent Act’s requirement for nonobviousness in § 103, some courts continued to apply a
standard remarkably similar to the one criticized by Justice Jackson. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side
Bar: The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in Principles of Patent Law, supra note 6, at 30, 30–31
(former Patent Office Commissioner Mossinghoff explaining importance of creating the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 to bring uniformity to the application of patent
law and avoid the results in some circuits, as discussed during the confirmation hearings for thenSecond Circuit Judge Thurgood Marshall’s nomination to the Supreme Court when he responded
to a question about patents by saying “I haven’t given patents much thought, Senator, because I’m
from the Second Circuit and as you know we don’t uphold patents in the Second Circuit”). Patent
theories like these are more about the absence of patents than about how or why we want patents
to operate.
109

The prospect and rent dissipation theories discussed earlier are two prime examples.
See supra Part I. The commercialization theory also discussed earlier differs from these two
theories in viewing the coordination effects of the patent not as a way to prevent rent-seeking or
rent-dissipating behavior but only as a way to facilitate the industrial organization activities
necessary to get the public to enjoy some benefit from a nascent invention. See supra notes 52–55
and accompanying text. The modest roles for the positive law prior art rules that are contemplated
in the registration theory discussed here are entirely compatible with the commercialization theory
and its views on the screening function played by competitors of the patentee. See supra notes 52–
55 and accompanying text.
110

See supra Part I; see also Kitch, supra note 30, at 267–71 (discussing importance of
broad claims early after initial discovery).
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those seeking the patent and not be needed to prevent rent dissipation among
those who otherwise would race to improve upon it.111
In contradistinction, the registration theory views the prior art rules as
designed to achieve the more modest goals of protecting investment-backed
expectations based on objective verifiable evidence, which is an approach that is
both workable and has explanatory power for the present system.112 The
registration theory begins from a presumption in favor of holding inventions to be
patentable over the prior art unless some verifiable evidence of sufficient reliance
is shown.113 Under this view, the system should have a novelty requirement to
protect those investments that have matured into actual technical activities.114
Similarly, the system should have something like a nonobviousness requirement
to protect those investments that are about to mature into actual technical
activities.115 For both requirements, the system should consider only those
investments that verifiably existed before those of the one claiming a patent
right.116
The registration theory has great explanatory power for the prior art
rules.117 The theory’s presumption in favor of not holding an invention
unpatentable over the prior art explains the often-overlooked introductory
language to the statutory prior art provisions, which sets forth that “[a] person
shall be entitled to a patent unless” any of the conditions subsequently provided in
the statute is triggered.118 Indeed, the registration theory also explains the
111

Grady & Alexander, supra note 31, at 346 (“By definition, an optimal proportion
cannot be improved upon; rent dissipation theory, therefore, predicts patent nonenforcement.”). In
part, the rent dissipation theory seems to be assuming that something may actually be “optimal” or
“good” in a way that assumes a great deal. Most importantly, it seems to implicitly subscribe to
some type of nirvana thesis, which is generally shunned in the literature because no example has
been offered of any human endeavor that is in all respects “optimal.” See supra note 8 (critiquing
nirvana approaches).
112

Compare supra notes 46–49 (prospect and rent dissipation theories do not offer
workable rules), with supra note 81, and infra notes 106–108 (reward theories do not offer
workable rules either).
113

Unlike the theories that focus on determining which claims to a patent are worth
protecting, the registration theory focuses on determining which claims to freedom from patent are
worth protecting.
114

See infra Part III.A.1.

115

See infra Part III.A.2.

116

See infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text (discussing how dates are compared).

117

See infra Parts III.A.1–4 (discussing the rules).

118

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). The many subsections of § 102, subsections (a) through (g),
then set forth the categories of things that can count as prior art. Any single piece of prior art,
sometimes also called a “reference,” will count as prior art for purposes of both the novelty and
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otherwise controversial statutory language that provides such a minimal role for
the Patent Office.119 In addition, present patent-obtaining prior art rules have been
considered by many, including me, to be “a statutory mine field through which
patent applicants must navigate.”120 With the benefit of the registration theory, they
can be seen as the expected intricacies of a system rationally designed to consider
all verifiable investments.121
What is more, the registration theory’s look to these prior art rules as
being triggered by relatively simple fact questions into the existence or
nonexistence of specific things or events reveals why it makes sense for patent
validity determinations to be made by the same ordinary civil judges and juries
that decide other cases. Determinations about what people verifiably have done or
are about to do implicate surprisingly simple questions of fact that do not require

statutory bar analyses of § 102 and the nonobviousness analysis of § 103 if it is determined to
trigger any one, or more than one, of the subsections of § 102. Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 554;
see also In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 984–90 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (overruling In re Palmquist, 319 F.2d
547 (C.C.P.A. 1963) to hold that despite plain meaning of the statute, art qualifying only under
§ 102(b) may support an analysis under § 103). For the reasons discussed more thoroughly by
Parchomovsky and Lichtman et al., the result in Foster is important to mitigate the costs
associated with strategic disclosure. See generally Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in
the Patent System, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2175 (2000); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 926 (2000).
119

See supra note 69 (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that because “the broadest of the [Patent Office’s] rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of
proceedings in the [Patent Office];’ it does not grant the Commissioner the authority” needed to in
turn entitle the Patent Office to the deference given other administrative agencies, which are
vested with sufficient power by Congress, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, USA,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
120
121

See, e.g., Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 323.

See infra Parts III.A.1–4. What is more, in accordance with the registration theory’s
goal of improving efforts to protect investments, many of these rules worked their way into our
regime over time even though they were not all present at the outset. See generally P.J. Federico,
Commentary on the New Patent Act, in Title 35, United States Code Annotated 1 (West 1954),
reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161 (1993) (reviewing history and operation of our
present patent system, which is largely based on the 1952 Patent Act); Edward C. Walterscheid,
The Ever Evolving Meaning of Prior Art (pts. 1–3, 4–6, 7–8, & pt. 9), 64 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc’y 457, 571, 632 (1982), 65 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 3, 477, 658 (1983), 66 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc’y 479, 573 (1984), 67 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 33 (1985) (reviewing
in detail the evolution of many of the prior art provisions that exist since the 1952 Patent Act and
collecting sources); Walterscheid, supra note 58 (reviewing the first roughly 100 years of the prior
art provisions with particular focus on the rules relating to derivation and foreign use).
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special technological training or judgment, and therefore are well suited for
adjudication by lay juries and judges.122

1. Novelty and Bar
The patent system’s patent-obtaining rules relating to the prior art begin
with those in § 102 of the statute, which relate to novelty and bar.123 “Anticipation
by the prior art” is the phrase in patent law used to describe the case where a
patent claim is directed to subject matter that is not new.124 “Statutorily barred” is
the phrase in patent law used to describe the case where a patent claim is directed
to subject matter that, even if new at the time of invention, was exposed to the
public more than a year before the application was filed.125 The registration view

122

F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex
Technological Questions of Patentability over the Prior Art, in Perspectives on Properties, supra
note 56, at 471, 473. Such a positive view of lay juries in patent cases marks a somewhat
counterintuitive departure from most of the other work in this field, including earlier work of my
own. See, e.g., S. Leslie Misrock and F. Scott Kieff, Latent Cures for Patent Pathology: Do Our
Civil Juries Promote Science and the Useful Arts?, presentation at The Crisis of Science and the
Law, Science in Crisis at the Millennium (an International Symposium), The George Washington
University Center for History of Recent Science (Sept. 19, 1996), in Principles of Patent Law,
supra note 6, at 1024, 1024–38; see also, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 365 n.2 (2000) (collecting
sources on “extensive scholarly debate and increasing skepticism regarding the role of juries in
patent cases”).
123

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (“Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent”). The mention in § 101 of the word “new” has not been read to provide any separate
novelty requirement. See Federico, supra note 121, at 178 (“The general part of the Committee
Report states that section 102 ‘may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for
patentability, and includes, in effect, an amplification and definition of “new” in section 101’”);
see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (1979) (“Notwithstanding the words ‘new and useful’ in
§ 101, the invention is not examined under that statute for novelty because that is not the statutory
scheme of things or the long-established administrative practice.”), dismissed as moot, 444 U.S.
1028 (1980).
124

The maxim setting forth the so-called “classic infringement test for anticipation,”
which also applies to analysis under the statutory bar, is “[t]hat which will infringe if later, will
anticipate, if earlier.” See Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 414 (citing Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221
(1893)). For more on how this test is applied in practice, see infra notes 141–150 and
accompanying text.
125

For a discussion of the bar, which also operates as a one-year grace period for filing,
see infra notes 137–140.
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elucidates why it makes sense for the patent system to have evolved these
doctrines in all their detail.126
In accordance with the registration view, printed publications describing a
technology count as prior art under the novelty provisions because publicly
available documents are good evidence of investment by their authors and of
something on which others could rely.127 Any printed publication will count, even
if in a foreign country, as long as it is verifiably the type of publication on which a
member of the public could rely.128 Indeed, even pending patent applications that
later issue as patents, but that are not yet published, count as prior art as of their
filing date because their inventors have invested in the verifiable contents of these
government-stored documents and those in confidential relationships with their
inventors could rely on them as well.129
Similarly, uses of a technology only count as prior art if corroborated by
someone other than the one claiming prior invention because verifiable public use

126

Compare supra note 48 and accompanying text (rent dissipation theory does not
explain case law), with supra note 108 and accompanying text (reward theories do not explain
case law).
127

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (referring to printed publications).

128

See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (counting a single cataloged
student thesis at Frieburg University in Germany as prior art because it was, inter alia, physically
available to the public); In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (not counting three
student theses at an American university as prior art, even though they were physically accessible
to the public, because there was no evidence they were logically accessible to the interested public
by, for example, being indexed in the library’s subject catalog). Under the registration theory these
publications should count as prior art because they might lead to third-party reliance, not because
they might somehow fairly be said to have been available to the patentee.
129

See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 399–402 (1926)
(Holmes, J.) (counting so-called secret prior art as prior art as of the application’s filing date). The
present version of this rule is codified in § 102(e)(2). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(2). For the same
reasons, an application filed in foreign patent offices will also count as prior art as of its filing date
with one of the international Patent Cooperation Treaty-designated patent offices, if filed
according to the procedural rules of the treaty, and as long as the application is eventually
published in English and designates that it should be sent to the United States Patent Office. Id.
Also for the same reasons, under § 102(e)(1), prior art effect is extended to pending applications
that do not issue as a patent but do get published under the rule of publishing eighteen months
after filing, which was part of the 1999 American Inventors Protection Act and is codified in
§ 122(b). Id. §§ 102(e)(1), 122(b). Applications not published pursuant to § 122(b), however, such
as those abandoned, do not count as prior art. The authors of these documents are able to maintain
their information as a trade secret but the documents themselves will not preclude patentability for
others. To be sure, the use by these authors may in certain circumstances preclude patentability
under § 102(a) or (g), as discussed infra at notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
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may induce investment in the technology by observers of this use.130 Although
§ 102(a) only expressly provides, in pertinent part, that the invention must not
have been “known or used by others,” the word “public” has been read into that
statutory language through case law.131 Use that is not public, yet also is not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, may also count as prior art under § 102(f)
and § 102(g), but only if corroborated by evidence other than inventor
testimony.132
Verifiable public use or sale sufficiently in advance of patent application
filing, even if by the one seeking a patent, can count as prior art against that
application under certain circumstances because it may induce investment in the
technology by observers of this use.133 For this reason, the statutory bar provisions
130

The registration protects against the risk of these investments being later subject to a
patent right to exclude by enforcing the rule that they destroy patentability.
131

Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 476, 494–98 (1850) (not counting use of a
technology relating to a safe as prior art unless it is accessible to the public). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
132

Section 102(f) is the provision governing cases of derivation, where the party claiming
the patent right derived the claimed information from someone else. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f); see
Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding that § 102(f) prevents patentability if there can be shown to be both prior, corroborated,
conception of the claimed invention, and its communication to the one claiming to be the first
inventor). Where the prior inventor turns out to have sought its own patent, the Patent Office
conducts something called an “interference proceeding,” which is the quasi-litigation process
initiated when a patent application claims the same subject matter as another application or an
issued patent to determine who is the first inventor. Section 102(g) is generally understood to
govern interference proceedings but also has been held to be a provision under which information
may be treated as prior art just like under the other subsections of § 102. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
See generally Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 441–51 (describing evolution of case law treating 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) as a provision under which prior use may count as prior art even if not public, as
long as it is not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, as well as the amount of evidence needed to
satisfy that provision). For more on the rules governing priority disputes, see infra Part III.A.3.
Where the prior inventor turns out to have been outside the United States, the rules become more
complicated, as discussed infra Part III.A.4. For more on why the use of priority of invention as a
test to determine who wins a patent right as between two or more claimants makes more sense
under the registration and commercialization theories than the use of filing date, because when
invention date is used it is more likely that a valid patent claim will emerge than when filing date
is used, see infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text.
133

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The policy goal of protecting investment has been recognized
in the case law associated with this prior art provision. See General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654
F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“First, there is a policy against removing inventions from the public
[that] the public has justifiably come to believe are freely available to all as a consequence of
prolonged sales activity.”).
Often described as a statutory bar to the patenting of inventions publicized for more than
a year, this provision operates to provide a one-year grace period for publicity that will not bar
patentability. The grace period entered the U.S. patent system in 1839 as a period of “grace”
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treat sale or use in public by either the inventor or a third party as prior art against
the inventor’s claim to a patent.134
The patent system even protects the inventor’s own investments to some
extent through allowance of a one-year grace period in which to file a patent
application before the on-sale and public use bars are triggered. This is important
because a patent system in which there is no grace period may provide incentives
for decreased rate of disclosure of new technologies, and a decrease in the overall
value of patents. The decreased rate of disclosure under a system lacking a grace
period would be due to the need to keep potentially patentable information
unpublished before filing the patent application.135 The decrease in overall value of
patents would be due to the fear of unknown but unavoidable pre-filing disclosures
lurking in the history of every patent.136
But the inventor’s own investments have to be balanced against the
reasonable reliance interests of others. For this reason, the grace period is limited
to one year, which allows others to rely on essentially any public evidence of a
technology that is beyond the time of the grace period.137 As soon as an inventor’s
use of the technology becomes available to the public,138 or is on sale at any stage
lasting two years. Act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 353. The period was shortened to one year in
1939. Act of August 5, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-288, 53 Stat. 1212. It remains so in the present 35
U.S.C. § 102(b).
Not all patent systems in the world provide a statutory grace period, although it is not
exactly clear whether most systems end up providing one through case law. See generally Joseph
Straus, Grace Period and the European and International Patent Law (2001) (study commissioned
by the European Patent Organization to examine whether European patent law should provide a
pre-filing grace period) (collecting sources).
134

See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (thirdparty use may raise statutory bar).
135

See Straus, supra note 133, at 80–81, 93 (discussing incentives to suppress publication
under a regime of no grace period).
136

Id. at 95–96 (discussing decrease in value of patents under absolute novelty regimes,
which do not have a grace period).
137

Under the registration theory, the specific amount of time is arbitrary as long as it is
fixed and knowable ex ante and as long as it is both long enough to allow some grace-period effect
and not long enough to unduly frustrate investment in recently public technologies. For some
history of the various grace periods, see supra note 133.
138

See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 333–38 (1882) (holding use even in a private
undergarment, here corset steels, can count as prior art). Compare Metallizing Eng’g Co. v.
Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 517–20 (2d Cir. 1946) (Hand, J.) (use will count
if it is commercial), with Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1878) (use will not count if
merely experimental). To whatever extent potential third-party reliance is a serious theoretical
matter, actual third-party public use as in Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058–59, counts as prior art because it
shows actual reliance.
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past when it is “ready for patenting,” the clock on the one-year window begins.139
The subsequent one year provides time for the inventor to decide whether to
prepare and file a patent application, and then to take these steps if elected.140
Taken together, these rules about what counts as prior art allow every
patent claim to be judged as of its “critical date” against a piece of prior art’s
“effective date.”141 The critical date is either the verifiable date of invention, or
one year before the application’s filing date, depending upon whether the
invention is being analyzed for anticipation or bar.142 The effective date is the date
the piece of prior art is allowed to count as prior art, as discussed above.143
Under § 102, patentability is precluded if any single item that is determined
to count as prior art under any single subsection of the statute is found to fully
disclose the claimed invention.144 Importantly, case law has provided a remarkably
easy test for determining whether an invention is fully disclosed for purposes of this
analysis, which can be seen through the use of the schematic claim chart in Table 1,
below.145
Table 1: Analysis Under § 102146
PAR1
E1
E2
E…
En
E*

139

Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998) (holding the year begins when the
technology is “subject to a commercial offer for sale” and “ready for patenting”).
140

The importance of taking the time to prepare a good application is discussed infra Part

141

Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 326 (providing sample analysis using these terms).

III.A.3.
142

Anticipation occurs when the claimed invention is found to have been in the art that
existed prior to the putative invention. See supra notes 118–132 and accompanying text. A
statutory bar occurs when the application is not filed within one year of a bar-triggering event. See
supra notes 133–139 and accompanying text.
143

This is either the date of use, publication, or filing, depending upon which part of
§ 102 is triggered. See supra notes 118–132 and accompanying text.
144

See supra note 124 (discussing basic statement of test for anticipation).

145

See infra notes 146–150 (discussing application of this test).

146

E1 through En represent the elements of the claim arbitrarily assigned numbers 1
through n. E* represents enablement of the entire claim. PAR1 represents any single prior art
reference, such as a journal article, sample product, student thesis, etc.
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Table 1 compares the elements of a stylized claim against the prior art for
a determination of potential unpatentability or invalidity under § 102.147 The
substantive requirement for determining no valid patent claim under § 102 is
triggered only if a single prior art reference discloses, either expressly or under
principles of inherency, each and every element of the claim, plus enablement.148
When mapped onto this table, this means that a proper holding of invalidity will

147

The term invalidity refers to the failure of a claim in an issued and successfully
examined patent to satisfy one of the substantive patent-obtaining rules. The term unpatentability
refers to the failure of a claim in a patent application to satisfy one of the substantive patentobtaining rules. These terms are interchangeable if operating under a soft-look system like the
registration model that does not involve any examination.
The representation of a claim as a listing of its several elements in claim charts like Table
1 has become so common in patent cases that the local rules of some courts that hear many patent
cases, like the Northern District of California, have for some time required their use. Chisum et al.,
supra note 6, at 848–49 (discussing local rules for claim charts). The identification of these
elements turns largely on the interpretation, or construction, of a patent claim, which is treated as a
matter of law for decision by the court, and which is the first step in any analysis of either validity
or infringement because the claim must be construed the same for both purposes. See generally id.
at 829–73 (discussing the substantive and procedural law of claim interpretation after the Supreme
Court decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). The great degree
of debate over the law of claim construction itself injects a degree of uncertainty into this
otherwise relatively crisp analysis. Recent empirical work by Wagner suggests that this
uncertainty may lessen over time as the Federal Circuit develops predictable trends in its case law.
See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003), available at
http://www.claimconstruction.com (discussing empirical work relating to trends in the Federal
Circuit’s law of claim construction) (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
148

See Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Johnson & Johnson, 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rich, J.) (invalidity under § 102 is “a question of fact, and one who seeks such a finding
must show that each element of the claim in issue is found, either expressly or under principles of
inherency, in a single prior art reference”); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“In
addition, the reference must be enabling and describe the applicant’s claimed invention
sufficiently to have placed it in possession of a person of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention.”); see also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“To establish
inherency, the extrinsic evidence ‘must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by
persons of ordinary skill. Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or
possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not
sufficient.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268,
1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). The inherency and enablement doctrines make sense under the
registration theory because a disclosure may induce third-party reliance based upon its ability to
enable those in the art to practice its teachings, even if those teachings do not contain all the words
that might appear in some patent claim. What matters for purposes of such reliance is substance,
not form.
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only lie if a check mark can be found as a matter of fact for every row.149 And to
achieve a check mark there must be admissible evidence that as a matter of fact the
pertinent content is present in the piece of prior art.150
Although this determination of novelty is relatively easy, the registration
theory recognizes that it may not go far enough in that parties may invest in a
technology before it fully exists.151 As a result, the patent system may have to go
beyond merely requiring inventions be new, or not fully disclosed in a single prior
art reference; it may also have to prevent valid patents from covering what anyone
is investing towards, if such a determination can be made inexpensively.152 Under
the registration theory, this is the role played by the nonobviousness requirement,
discussed below.153

2. Nonobviousness
The patent system has long demanded something more than mere novelty
when determining patentability over the prior art. This additional requirement is
called “nonobviousness” in the present system.154 It has been given labels in
previous systems that are as tautological as “the requirement for invention;” and
its various forms have generated great difficulty for the courts for over a
century.155 It also raises significant problems for the patent theories in the
literature.156
149

This represents the presence of each element in the claim, plus enablement, which as
discussed in the case law supra note 148, is required for a finding of invalidity under § 102.
150

As discussed in the case law, supra note 148, invalidity under § 102 requires the prior
art disclosure to be in a single reference.
151

Indeed, the likelihood of these investments is logically closely tied to the presence in
the art of a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine elements in the prior art to
work towards the claimed invention. The registration view thereby provides a justification for the
case law that requires these elements as part of a nonobviousness analysis. For more on the law of
nonobviousness, see infra Part III.A.2.
152

The ultimate question of whether it goes far enough will turn on whether these
investments can be efficiently identified and protected. As discussed infra in Part III.A.2, although
it is clear that the nonobviousness test does a better job on this score than the former “requirement
for invention,” it is not entirely clear whether the case law relating to the test of nonobviousness
has implemented the test optimally.
153

See supra note 86 (the registration theory helps explain the intricacies of the patentobtaining rules whereas the other theories do not).
154

For history of the nonobviousness requirement in patent law, see generally
Nonobviousness—The Ultimate Condition of Patentability, supra note 38; Sirilla, supra note 108.
155

During the first half of the 1900s when called the requirement for invention, before the
1952 Patent Act, it had become known as “the plaything of the judiciary.” Giles S. Rich, Why and
How Section 103 Came to Be, in Nonobviousness—The Ultimate Condition of Patentability,
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The version of this requirement called nonobviousness was written into
the patent system through the 1952 Patent Act to statutorily jettison the prior case
law associated with the former, vague and anti-patent, requirement called “the
requirement for invention.”157 Even the drafters of this new standard recognized
that it did not, on its face, appear to be any more precise in application than the
former requirement.158 Nevertheless, as the registration theory would predict, the
supra note 38, at 1:208. Even after Congress wrote the § 103 nonobviousness into the statute in
the 1952 Patent Act, over ten years passed before the Supreme Court applied the new standard of
nonobviousness in Graham and its companion cases. 383 U.S. at 12–37 (consolidated with
Calmar and Colgate-Palmolive); Adams, 383 U.S. at 48–52. For an inside look at the Graham
decision, see Tom Arnold, Side Bar: The Way the Law of Section 103 Was Made, in Principles of
Patent Law, supra note 6, at 549, 549–54. Soon afterwards, the Court re-injected confusion by
writing about synergism and combinations. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)
(holding patent invalid because it was a mere combination of old elements and had no synergistic
effect); Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc., v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (holding
patent invalid because “No such synergistic result is argued here”). These terms were not weeded
back out of the law until the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982. See Sirilla, supra note 108, at
543. As the Federal Circuit has reminded:
A requirement for “synergism” or a “synergistic effect” is nowhere found in the statute, 35 U.S.C.
When present, for example in a chemical case, synergism may point toward nonobviousness, but its
absence has no place in evaluating the evidence on obviousness. . . .
The reference to a “combination patent” is equally without support in the statute. There is no
warrant for judicial classification of patents, whether into “combination” patents and some other
unnamed and undefined class or otherwise. Nor is there warrant for differing treatment or
consideration of patents based on a judicially devised label. Reference to “combination” patents is,
moreover, meaningless. Virtually all patents are “combination patents,” if by that label one intends to
describe patents having claims to inventions formed of a combination of elements. It is difficult to
visualize, at least in the mechanical-structural arts, a “non-combination” invention, i.e., an invention
consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they exist, are rare indeed.

Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
156

See supra notes 30–49 and accompanying text (other theories merely point out rentseeking concerns that are implicated by patents and at best suggest that ex ante determinations be
made about which patents turn out to be better at decreasing the rent-seeking type of social cost).
157

See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 Am.
Pat. L. Ass’n Q.J. 26 (1972), reprinted in Nonobviousness—The Ultimate Condition of
Patentability, supra note 38, at 1:501 [hereinafter Rich, Laying the Ghost] (discussing the great lag
between the arrival of the new standard in the statute and its adoption by the courts); Giles S.
Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J.
Pat. Off. Soc’y 855 (1964), reprinted in Nonobviousness—The Ultimate Condition of
Patentability, supra note 38, at 1:401 (Judge Rich’s speech upon receipt of the Kettering Award in
which he discusses the role of nonobviousness in § 103 as the replacement for the so-called
requirement for invention).
158

Compare Federico, supra note 121, at 183 (the requirement for invention “is an
unmeasurable quantity having different meanings for different persons”), with id. at 184 (“The
problem of what is obvious and hence unpatentable is still of necessity one of judgment.”).
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case law interpreting this new standard correctly has provided an objective and
practicable framework tied to third-party investments.159
The analysis for a nonobviousness determination under § 103 begins with
the entire body of prior art determined to be available under § 102.160 But
important areas of the prior art are then carved out so they can be excluded from
the nonobviousness analysis.161 First, only art considered to be analogous may be
considered under the nonobviousness analysis.162 Under the registration theory,
which looks to protect the reasonable investment-backed expectations of third
parties, non-analogous art is properly discarded because it is not likely to be the

159

See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text (discussing role of nonobviousness
analysis according to registration theory).
160

See Federico, supra note 121, at 180:

In form this section is a limitation on section 102 and it should more logically have been made part of
section 102, but it was made a separate section to prevent 102 from becoming too long and involved
and because of its importance. The antecedent of the words “the prior art,” which here appear in a
statute for the first time, lies in the phrase “disclosed or described as set forth in section 102” and
hence these words refer to the material specified in section 102 as the basis for comparison.

Id.
161

Although all of the § 102 art is initially available for analysis under § 103, certain
types of prior art are excluded. According to the registration theory, these carve outs exist to
remove from consideration the prior art for which the inference of possible innocent third-party
reliance is not reasonable. See infra notes 162–166 and accompanying text (discussing carve outs).
162

The statute provides that the analysis should look to a hypothetical “person having
ordinary skill in the art to which [the claimed] subject matter pertains” and ask whether to that
person “the [invention] as a whole would have been obvious” given the “differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). This in turn
requires that several factual inquiries be made: “the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. A person having
ordinary skill in the art according to this framework is sometimes called a PHOSITA, thanks to the
coining of that term by Soans. Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10
IDEA 433, 438–39 (1966). The “pertinent art” is selected from among the entire set of prior art
identified by § 102 depending upon whether it is analogous or non-analogous. According to the
Federal Circuit:
Two criteria have evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is from
the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within
the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.
In re Clay, 956 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1475 (affirming
Patent Office rejection under § 103 because references from the fields of cabinetry and desktop accessories are
properly considered to be analogous art to a patent claim directed to a clamshell case for a laptop computer under
the second of these two alternative criteria).
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basis for any such reliance.163 Importantly, as would be predicted by the registration
theory, the distinction between analogous and non-analogous art is viewed as
important, not as evidence of what the inventor himself or herself could have
known about the art, but rather what was knowable to a hypothetical third party
having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”).164 Second, secret prior art that would
count only under § 102(e), (f), and (g) has been statutorily excluded from the
nonobviousness analysis if it is owned by the same entity whose patent claim is at
issue.165 The exclusion of this art also makes sense under the registration theory
because no third-party investments will have been made in art that is commonly
owned and kept secret.166
163

See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of the prior art
rules under the registration theory).
164

See Soans, supra note 162, at 438–39 (coining the term PHOSITA). Indeed, Judge
Rich, who co-authored § 103, has portrayed this PHOSITA “as working in his shop with the prior
art references—which he is presumed to know—hanging on the walls around him.” In re
Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.) (this metaphor is referred to as the
“Winslow Tableau”); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d
955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed
to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”); Int’l Cellucotton Prods. Co. v. Sterilek Co., 94 F.2d 10,
13 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.) (“[W]e must suppose the inventor to be endowed, as in fact no
inventor ever is endowed; we are to impute to him knowledge of all that is not only in his
immediate field, but in all fields nearly akin to that field.”). Judge Rich improved upon the
Winslow Tableau in In re Antle:
In Winslow we said that the principal secondary reference was “in the very same art” as appellant’s
invention and characterized all the references as “very pertinent art.” The language relied on by the
solicitor, quoted above, therefore, does not apply in cases where the very point in issue is whether one of
ordinary skill in the art would have selected, without the advantage of hindsight and knowledge of the
applicant’s disclosure, the particular references which the examiner applied. As we also said in Winslow,
“Section 103 requires us to presume full knowledge by the inventor of the prior art in the field of his
endeavor” (emphasis, except of “prior,” added), but it does not require us to presume full knowledge by
the inventor of prior art outside the field of his endeavor, i.e., of “non-analogous” art. In that respect, it
only requires us to presume that the inventor would have that ability to select and utilize knowledge from
other arts reasonably pertinent to his particular problem which would be expected of a man of ordinary
skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains.

444 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
165

See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (providing carve outs). The carve outs for § 102(f) and (g)
were added in 1984 to reverse the holding in In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1288–91 (Fed. Cir. 1973).
See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 103, 98 Stat. 3383, 3384 (1984).
The carve out for § 102(e) was added in 1999 through § 4807 of the American Inventors
Protection Act of 1999. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4807,
113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-591 (1999). For a discussion of the history of these carve outs, see
Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 575–78.
166

No carve out is needed for the novelty analysis because the co-owner can keep the
information sufficiently secret before the later claim that the reference will not trigger any of the
subsections of § 102, except perhaps § 102(f). See 35 U.S.C. § 102. For this subsection,
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The content of the remaining prior art as a whole must then be surveyed to
determine whether it may have reasonably triggered investment-backed
expectations in achieving the subject matter of the patent claim in issue.167 Such
investments are most likely to have existed only when there can be found among
these many remaining pieces of art each and every element of the claimed subject
matter along with sufficient teaching, motivation, or suggestion for the pieces that
contain those elements to be combined such that there would be a reasonable
expectation of success in establishing the claimed subject matter when they are
combined.168 The practical operation of this analysis can be seen through the use of
the schematic claim chart in Table 2, below.

derivation, the co-owner can seek a claim by naming the first inventor, whose activity is coowned. If the earlier reference does not disclose enough to invalidate under a novelty analysis then
it would not have been possible for the subject matter to have been claimed at the time of the
earlier reference, and the only opportunity to claim the subject matter is at the later time. The
exclusion of the prior art from a nonobviousness analysis at that later time helps ensure the
possibility of it being covered by a claim. Because the subject matter is co-owned with the prior
art and is not otherwise available under any of the other subsections of § 102, it also is not the
target of third-party investment.
167

See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of the nonobviousness
requirement according to the registration theory).
168

According to the Federal Circuit:

The consistent criterion for determination of obviousness is whether the prior art would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this process should be carried out and would have a
reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in the light of the prior art. Both the suggestion and the
expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, not in the applicant’s disclosure.
In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Chisum et al., supra note 6,
at 584–97 (discussing contours of this analysis in practice and collecting sources).
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Table 2: Analysis Under § 103169
PAR1

PAR2

E1
E2
E…
En
E*
TMS
RES

Like Table 1, Table 2 compares the elements of a stylized claim against the
prior art, but this time for a determination of nonobviousness under § 103.170
Invalidity under this rule of nonobviousness also requires the presence in the prior
art reference, either expressly or under principles of inherency, of each and every
element of the claim, plus enablement. But, unlike the analysis under § 102, the
analysis under § 103 allows the elements to be spread among two or more
individual pieces of prior art, as long as some additional facts are present: teaching,
motivation, or suggestion to combine those references to obtain the subject matter
of the claim as a whole (“TMS”), plus a reasonable expectation of success in
achieving the claimed subject matter upon the combination (“RES”).171 When
169

As in Table 1, E1 through En represent the elements of the claim arbitrarily assigned
numbers 1 through n; and E* represents enablement of the entire claim. See supra note 146 and
accompanying text. In this table, PAR1 and PAR2 each represent any single prior art reference,
such as a journal article, sample product, student thesis, etc. The key to the analysis under § 103 is
that it permits the looking to more than one reference in the prior art to find all the elements of the
claim plus enablement but only if in those references there can also be found (1) a teaching,
motivation, or suggestion (TMS in the table) for those references to be combined to form the
claimed subject matter as well as (2) a reasonable expectation of success (RES in the table) that
the claimed subject matter will result when the references are so combined.
The apparent crispness of this framework may be somewhat illusory for several reasons.
First, as with Table 1, there is some uncertainty regarding claim construction. See supra note 147
(discussing uncertainty about the law of claim construction and its application in any given case).
Second, as discussed, supra note 162, the determination of obviousness is to be done from the
perspective of a PHOSITA, and the case law leaves some substantial uncertainty as to how this
hypothetical person is to be conceptualized. The Federal Circuit has provided a number of factors
to consider when determining the characteristics of the PHOSITA:
Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the
educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to
those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology;
and (6) educational level of the workers in the field.
Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Chisum et al., supra note 6, at
597–600 (discussing the case law relating to the determination of the PHOSITA).
170

See supra note 147 (discussing the validity and patentability analyses).

171

For a discussion of the case law leading up to this composite test, see supra notes

162–168.
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mapped onto this table, this means that a proper holding of invalidity or
unpatentability under § 103 will only lie if a check mark can be found as a matter of
fact for every row and at least some tie can be made across all columns using the
TMS and RES that must be found in at least one of the rows.172
Unfortunately, the appropriateness of the nonobviousness requirement is
not entirely clear under the registration theory. To the extent that the analysis
operates as crisply as suggested by Table 2, it makes sense as a reasonably
inexpensive way to protect against verifiable investments that may have been
made towards a technology.173 The practice may deviate some from this
framework, however, when requiring that in every case some weight be attributed
to the so-called secondary considerations of nonobviousness: chiefly, commercial
success and long-felt need and failure of others.174 Long-felt need and failure by
others may not represent a deviation and may instead fit well within the
registration theory’s framework as outlined in Table 2 because they may be

172

The nonobviousness analysis is presently pertinent when determining patentability
before the Patent Office and when determining validity in litigation, but under a soft-look system
would only be relevant in litigation. See supra note 147.
173

See supra notes 151–153 (discussing role of nonobviousness under registration theory).

174

As the Court in Graham stated when describing these secondary considerations and
their purpose:
Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have
relevancy. . . .
....
. . . These legal inferences or subtests do focus attention on economic and motivational rather than
technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial treatment than are the highly technical
facts often present in patent litigation. Such inquires may lend a helping hand to the judiciary which,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, is most ill-fitted to discharge the technological duties cast upon it
by patent legislation. They may also serve to “guard against slipping into use of hindsight,” and to
resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.

383 U.S. at 17–18, 35–36 (citations omitted). It is important to realize that even this initial
Supreme Court statement of the secondary considerations raises the specter of endeavoring to
judge the technological merit of the record rather than its factual content, as the registration theory
would require. That is, under the registration theory, the framework is a factual one that anyone
well skilled in trial and appellate practice can use, whereas the Court seems to be suggesting a
deeper foray into the technological merit by speaking of “technological duties.”
The Federal Circuit has gone further than the Supreme Court in Graham by requiring:
“evidence rising out of the so-called ‘secondary considerations’ must always when present be
considered en route to a determination of obviousness.” Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538–39; see also
Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 601–12 (discussing the case law and commentary on the secondary
considerations and collecting sources).
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probative evidence of a lack of TMS and RES, in which case the art may fairly be
said to “teach away” from the failed approaches.175
In contrast, commercial success may deviate materially from the
framework of the registration theory, although for reasons different than identified
in the literature.176 Exemplifying the literature critical of the commercial success
factor, Robert Merges urges that the system will operate better when “focus
returns to the invention’s technical merits” because we should question “the
spurious inferential connection between success and significant technical
advance.”177 In his work on the prospect theory, Kitch takes a different view of
commercial success arguing that this factor matters under the prospect theory
because it shows that the patent has become “the foundation for a series of now
valuable contract rights.”178 On first blush it may appear that the
commercialization theory would view commercial success the same way, for
similar reasons. That is, commercial success might be seen as relevant not
because it says something about how hard it was to make the invention, but only
because it says something about how commercially relevant the subject matter has
become.179
Although the commercial success consideration may seem to map on to
the incentive to commercialize discussed earlier, it is not clear that this factor
175

See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing TMS and RES); see also In re
Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994):
A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference,
would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction
divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant. The degree of teaching away will of course
depend on the particular facts; in general, a reference will teach away if it suggests that the line of
development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought
by the applicant.

Id.
176

In his work pre-dating the prospect theory, Kitch pointed out that commercial success
may be a poor indicator of the nonobviousness of an invention because it relies upon too long of a
chain of doubtful inferences between the original state of the art and the eventual success. Edmund
Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293, 331–33.
Commercial success, however, may operate as a good proxy for what was not being done by
others to the extent it can be determined that its primary cause is the invention itself, as opposed to
other factors such as marketing or happenstance. One problem with making such determinations is
that they easily can be influenced by reward theory and thereby become as indeterminate as the
reward theory.
177

Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 838–42 (1988) (citing Kitch, supra note 176, at 330–35).
178
179

Kitch, supra note 30, at 282–83.

See Kieff, supra note 11, at 707–10 (discussing the commercialization theory’s focus
on providing incentives for commercialization).
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should be considered if minimizing social cost is the goal.180 With the benefit of
the registration and commercialization theories combined, commercial success
may turn out to be properly ignored as a potential factor of nonobviousness
because the factor places too much focus on the merits of the invention, which
leads to it not being workable, and not enough focus on the investment-backed
expectations by third parties, which is what matters under these theories.181
Therefore, in the final analysis, it may not be advisable to abandon the § 103
requirement of nonobviousness in its entirety because most of the nonobviousness
framework is shown both to work well according to the registration theory and be
well explained by the registration theory.182

3. First-to-Invent
The patent system’s rules governing priority contests between two or more
claimants to a patent right protect investment by awarding the patent to the one
who was first to invent, not first to file.183 As recognized by the
commercialization theory, a shift to a first-to-file system may lead to an increased
likelihood that neither party in a priority dispute will remain with a valid patent
because the increased incentive to file early that may operate to make one party a

180

See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (discussing registration theory’s goals
of minimizing social cost).
181

See supra notes 27, 81, 106–107 and accompanying text (discussing problems with
focus on the merits of the inventions); see also supra notes 93–103 and accompanying text
(discussing importance of investment-backed expectations by third parties). In cases where enough
time has gone by for there to be evidence of commercial success, there is usually an infringer or
two and then the court is left trying to determine whether to decide in favor of the coordination
benefits of patents or in favor of protecting the investments of the infringers. In a single-cycle game
it may be easy to decide in favor of protecting the infringer’s investment. But in a multi-cycle game
such a rule would provide incentives to infringe too much and in an uncoordinated fashion and so
instead the coordination benefits dominate and evidence of commercial success, or lack thereof,
should be ignored, not required.
182

Only to the extent the secondary factors so soften the crispness of the framework
modeled in Table 2 that the net benefits of the entire nonobviousness standard fade should it then
be abandoned in its entirety. See supra note 46 (suggesting that the registration theory may not
require the nonobviousness standard and noting that Kitch, supra note 30, may not be to the
contrary). This conclusion, although admittedly not this reasoning, accords with the views of at
least one framer of the 1952 Patent Act who described nonobviousness as “the heart of the patent
system and the justification of patent grants.” Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 157, at 1:501.
183

Whereas priority under a first-to-file system is awarded to the application that is filed
first regardless of priority of invention, under a first-to-invent system like the present patent
system, priority is awarded to the first inventor. See Kieff, supra note 11, at 749–50 (discussing
differences between these two types of priority regimes and collecting sources).
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winner on priority might also have caused that party to file an application with
inadequate disclosure.184
In contrast, under a first-to-invent system there is less of an incentive to
rush to file because priority is not determined by filing and, as a result, there is a
lower likelihood that the winner on priority will be left with a patent that fails to
meet the disclosure requirements.185 The first-to-invent system thereby at least
protects the investments of one of the claimants.186 In addition, first-to-file may

184

As explained by the commercialization theory when discussing incentive to file early
and its interaction with the disclosure requirements:
A hastily filed application is more likely to be found invalid for nonenablement or lack of written
description under recent Federal Circuit case law. See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200,
1213–18 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying the statutory requirement that the text of the patent application as
filed contain sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art to make and use whatever is covered by patent
claims as eventually issued and applying separate written description requirement to claims in the field
of biotechnology); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkur, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–67 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the
statute also requires the text of the patent application as filed to satisfy the separate and distinct written
description requirement so as to reasonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the
patent claims as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213–18 (applying separate
written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164,
1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (solidifying the court’s position on a separate written description requirement);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (further
solidifying the court’s position on a separate written description requirement); Lockwood v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the same written description requirement
to the field of computer software); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1437, 1479–80 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (indicating that the written description requirement is not limited to complex technologies but
applies equally to simple technologies, like sofa recliners) . . . .

Kieff, supra note 11, at 750 n.239; see also S. Leslie Misrock & Stephen S. Rabinowitz, Side Bar:
The Inventor’s Gamble: Written Description and Prophetic Claiming of Biotechnology Inventions,
in Principles of Patent Law, supra note 6, at 319, 319–22 (discussing the application of the separate
written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology).
185

The reasoning here is similar to that for the one-year grace period. See supra note 140
and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the grace period to allow time to file a
properly drafted application when measured under the disclosure requirements of § 112). For more
on the disclosure requirements, see infra Part III.B.
186

The investments of the one who wins the priority dispute are protected. This thereby
provides for some commercialization benefit, which is important under the commercialization
theory, and some protection of investment-backed expectations on the part of at least one of the
parties, which is important under the registration theory. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that
under the present system most interference proceedings are won by the first to file anyway. See
Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840 (Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences 2001) (approximate 75% success rate for the first to file); Charles R.B. Macedo,
First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?,
18 Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n Q.J. 193, 217 (1990) (same); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. Firstto-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y
425, 427 (2002) (between 1983 and 2000, the first to file won 1917 of the 2858 interference
cases). But see Charles L. Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 84 J. Pat.
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lead to a winner-take-all mindset for those seeking patents. This, in turn, may
cause a reduction in the beneficial inducing power of the reward because each
potential claimant may find the possibility of winning the race to be too low.
Alternatively, it may cause the harmful, rent-dissipating power to increase as the
increase in uncertainty causes even more individuals to gamble on winning the
race.187
A first-to-invent regime does increase litigation frequency by bringing
priority disputes to available contests, but this is beneficial because such disputes
can also reach issues of validity.188 The costs of determining validity in such a
proceeding are likely to be less than in a hard-look examination because the
opponent in such a priority dispute is like the alleged infringer in litigation in its
ability to more cheaply obtain and evaluate the information needed to determine
validity.189 The registration theory thereby explains the persistence of the first-toinvent aspect of the present patent system despite harmonization efforts to have
the United States match the rest of the world, which uses first-to-file.190

4. Prior Foreign Use
Like the rules governing novelty generally, the rules about prior foreign
use make sense under the registration theory as tools for protecting verifiable
investment-backed expectations.191 For most of the past century, prior use that
was outside of this country would not count for purposes of either staking a claim
to priority for purposes of obtaining patent rights in a priority contest or defeating

& Trademark Off. Soc’y 163, 181 (2002) (suggesting that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) data reports that the first to file has recently been winning in only 52.5% of the cases).
187

See Kieff supra note 11, at 711 (discussing Grady & Alexander, supra note 31, and
the problem of rent-seeking and rent-dissipating effects in patent law).
188

See Charles L. Gholz, Side Bar: Interferences, in Principles of Patent Law, supra note
6, at 511–13 (describing the interference process and its ability to reach issues of validity).
189

The parties to the priority dispute either have the information relating to the prior art
themselves because their own work is being used as prior art against each other or they at least have
the same if not greater incentives to find that information as does an ordinary defendant in a litigation
who is serving the screening function identified by the commercialization theory. See supra notes 59–
64 and accompanying text (discussing the screening function).
190

See Kieff supra note 11, at 748–50 (discussing harmonization efforts in relation to
first-to-file and first-to-invent).
191

See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing registration theory on prior art
rules and the goal of protecting investment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable
evidence).
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patent rights in a challenge to validity.192 But since 1994, uses that occur in
countries that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) or the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) will be available when
seeking to obtain a patent in a priority dispute against another claimant—as a
sword—but not when seeking to defeat a patent owned by another—as a shield.193
By making prior foreign use that occurs within a country with whom we
are a trading partner under either of these treaties available to support a claim to a
patent, these revisions protect those investment-backed expectations made abroad
that are sufficiently serious to have led to the filing of a patent application.194 By
leaving all other foreign prior use unavailable to defeat a patent, these revisions
protect the investments of the one who filed the patent application and disregard
those of others whose use is not corroborated by a printed publication.195 The
registration theory’s focus on verifiable evidence of potential investment-backed
expectations thereby explains what may otherwise appear to be an intricate effort
to favor domestic interests.

B. The Disclosure Rules Help Coordinate
Under the registration theory, the § 112196 disclosure requirements
decrease social costs by serving to give clear notice about the property right, and
to decrease the chance of duplicative efforts towards the same invention.197 The

192

This is in contrast with the impact of prior use as discussed supra notes 130–132 and
accompanying text (discussing rules relating to prior use).
193

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 104 (2000) (as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 531(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4982–83 (1994); North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 331, 107 Stat. 2057, 2113–14 (1993)).
For more on the operation of these new provisions, see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 489–91
(discussing legislative changes and explaining their practical impact).
194

See supra note 112 (discussing registration theory on prior art rules and the goal of
protecting investment-backed expectations based on objective verifiable evidence).
195

See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text (printed publications anywhere in the
world may be available as prior art because they are verifiable).
196

35 U.S.C. § 112 paras. 1–2 (setting forth the disclosure requirements of patent law: (1)
written description; (2) enablement; (3) best mode; and (4) definiteness, which is also stated as the
requirement that the claims “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]”). The requirements of
enablement, written description, and best mode are each judged by comparing the claims as issued to
the application as filed. See id. para. 1 (requirements of the specification as filed); id. § 132
(prohibition against adding new matter). For a discussion of the operation of the disclosure
requirements, see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 161–322.
197

This signaling function is recognized by Kitch in his discussion of the prospect theory.
Kitch, supra note 30, at 287 (“The purpose of the description in the patent is not to disclose the
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s strong reading of the written
description requirement to put the public on clear notice of what will infringe and
what will not makes sense because the patentee, as the drafter, is the least-cost
avoider of such ambiguities.198 This legal development was controversial to be
sure; yet it marks an important weapon in the system’s arsenal for fighting social
cost. Pro-patent arguments against this development because it leads to the
invalidation of particular patents should be ignored because this requirement helps
to minimize the social cost of the system.199 Anti-patent arguments focused on
particular patents—such as those on gene fragments—should also be ignored.
Such patents are much less likely to cause the pernicious clogging of downstream
innovation than feared. In addition, transaction costs may not be as big of an
obstacle as they may seem,200 because under this case law many such downstream
activities would not infringe most such valid claims.201
commercially relevant technology, but to provide a context in which the legal limits of the claim
acquire meaning.”).
198

See supra note 184 (discussing disclosure rules and their impact on patentees’
decisions to file more complete disclosures at time of filing).
199

Because the applicant’s patent attorney drafts the disclosure for the patent application
before filing, she is the least-cost avoider of litigation on compliance with the disclosure
requirements as long as the legal standards for these requirements are clear and attainable.
200

See generally Eisenberg, Experimental Use, supra note 6 (exploring an experimental use
exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviating potential negative impact of patent
rights on scientific norms in the field of basic biological research); Eisenberg, Norms of Science,
supra note 6 (exploring potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of
basic biological research); Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 6 (offering preliminary
observations about the empirical record of the use of patents in the field of basic biological research
and recommending a retreat from present government policies of promoting patents in that field);
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6 (arguing that patents can deter innovation in the field of basic
biological research); Rai, supra note 6 (suggesting that patents on multiple gene fragments, such as
ESTs, could block the use of a larger DNA sequence of which they are a part).
201

Kieff, supra note 6, at 699–700 (showing why a patent claim directed to a gene
fragment like an EST cannot be construed to cover a larger DNA sequence, such as a substantial
portion of an entire gene, and citing Kieff, supra note 11, at 721–22 (noting that if the patentee
attempts to argue that the claim to the smaller fragment covers the fragment within the
environment of the larger DNA, then the claim is likely to be held invalid over the prior art or for
lack of adequate disclosure because to be valid, the claimed subject matter must be new and
nonobvious, and the patent application must disclose the metes and bounds of the claimed subject
matter with physical and chemical detail as well as how to make and use it, and alternatively
pointing out that because ESTs exist in nature in the company of the other DNA of the genome, a
typical EST claim must be limited in order to overcome this prior art to a version of the EST in
some specific environment other than its natural one, such as isolated from all other DNA or
inserted into an artificially engineered piece of DNA, and the details of the degree of isolation or
of the engineered piece of DNA must also be provided so as to satisfy the disclosure
requirements)). Ironically, many of the arguments that see a large anticommons problem with
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Although not strictly speaking a requirement about the content of a patent
application, the new statutory requirement for publication of applications eighteen
months after filing is properly considered here.202 This is because it can operate
similarly to the disclosure requirements in improving the important signaling
function patents play in controlling the potential rent-seeking, and therefore rentdissipating, behavior of those others who also might be working towards the same
invention as claimed in the patent.203 Indeed, the registration model explored in
this Article would go a great deal further towards disseminating information about
patent applications by posting them on the World Wide Web for free as soon after
filing as administratively practicable.204

C. Summary: The Name of the Game is the Claim
The registration theory’s view that the patent system can and should
operate to minimize social costs is confirmed by recent and important empirical
work by John Allison and Lemley, which shows that by almost any measure
patents are becoming what they call “more complex” over time.205 The increase in
the number of prior art references cited and the length of prosecution before the
Patent Office, which Allison and Lemley identify and then use as proxies for
complexity, can be seen as evidence that issued patents are getting better scrutiny

patents on things like ESTs also criticize these aspects of the Federal Circuit’s approach to the
written description requirement; yet the latter ameliorates the former.
202

American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502, 113 Stat.
1501A-552, 1501A-561 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000)) (eighteen month
publication of applications).
203

Thus, the eighteen-month publication provision of patent law is one for which the
prospect and rent dissipation theories discussed supra Part I also have good explanatory power.
204

For a discussion of the registration model, see supra Part II. Although the registration
theory suggests adoption of the registration model and immediate publication, the registration
theory may not be quite as supportive of such pre-issuance publication under an examination
system like the present one because it will have to reach compromises that are undoubtedly fair
from a systemic perspective but that will yield a variety of incentives for strategic behavior, such
as the incentive by competitors to, before grant of the patent, use the publication to teach them
how to engage in as much otherwise infringing activity as possible, and the incentives to achieve a
stronger bargaining position against a competitor using the leverage of its investments based on a
public use up to just under thirty-six months before publication of the application (based on the
combined one-year grace period and eighteen-month publication windows). For a discussion of
the legislative compromises reached under the eighteen-month publication provisions of the
current system, see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 116–22.
205

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 77 passim (2002) (providing empirical evidence on complexity of patents).
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without moving towards a hard-look system.206 Furthermore, the increase in
variation among patents identified by the Allison and Lemley article can be seen
as evidence of increased selectivity in deciding which patents get increased
scrutiny.207
The combination of these two effects provides some evidence that it is
patentees themselves who are acting rationally to choose to increase scrutiny on
only those patents they believe to be most important.208 If so, then they are acting
in a way that both internalizes and mitigates social cost.209
Patentees are motivated to rationally choose to behave this way because
they face a complex gamble when selecting claim scope.210 The requirements for
206

Cf., e.g., Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents,
1971–2000, at 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7918, 2000), at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7918 (suggesting that poor patent quality of some early business
method patents may be due to their relatively anemic citation of prior art, which is one of the
complexity parameters explored by Allison and Lemley, supra note 205).
207

Patent applicants and their patent attorneys draft the patent disclosure and claims. The
Patent Office can reject or allow the claims but otherwise has only limited input to the content. For
an overview of the process of arguing to the Patent Office for the right to a patent, which is called
“patent prosecution,” see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 91–128. The increase in variation seen by
Allison and Lemley is therefore evidence that some patentees are choosing to seek patents that are
less likely to withstand challenge in court, and others are seeking patents that are more likely to
withstand such challenge.
208

That is, this may be evidence of a type of self-screening by the patentees themselves
based on what challenges to validity they anticipate their competitors might mount. See supra notes
59–64 (discussing the screening function). Importantly, to make these determinations effectively, the
patentees themselves often have to seek out the very information relating to validity that, in the first
instance, is in the hands of third parties and would cost an opponent of the patentee substantial
money to seek out and bring to bear later to support arguments over validity in civil litigation.
Patentees are thereby internalizing those social costs when they get this information and the litigation
conduct reforms discussed infra Part IV.E would provide added incentives for patentees to put this
information to proper use. For more on self-screening by patentees, see generally John R. Allison &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming
November 2003) (referring to this issue as the “self-selected value theory”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=421980; John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J.
(forthcoming 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=426020.
209

Those patents that are getting better treatment up front by the applicants are less likely
to cause the pernicious impact associated with the one-click patent discussed supra notes 1–4 and
accompanying text, which is caused by any issued patent that is legally presumed valid because it
issued yet nevertheless quite likely to be held invalid in court in practice. See supra Part II
(comparing the advantages of the registration model over the present examination practice).
210

Many of the important decisions facing a patentee must be made ex ante before filing
the application for several reasons. First, the disclosure requirements compare the claims as issued
against the application as filed. See supra Part III.B. Second, the statutory bar aspects of the prior
art requirements measure the claims as issued against the state of the art at filing. See supra Part
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patentability discussed above operate in concert to force a form of self-discipline
on patent scope that mitigates the complex economic concerns explored by
Merges and Richard Nelson.211 As Judge Giles S. Rich often said about patents,
“the name of the game is the claim . . . [and] the function of claims is to enable
everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes the patent and
what does not.”212 According to Judge Rich, claims present a fundamental
dilemma for every patentee because “the stronger a patent the weaker it is and the
weaker a patent the stronger it is.”213 By this he meant that a broad patent claim is
strong on offense because it covers more and, therefore, is more likely to be
infringed, but it also is weak on defense because it may cover something in the
prior art or fail to be supported by a sufficiently detailed disclosure in the rest of
the patent, and, therefore, is more likely to be invalid. In contrast, a narrow claim
is weak on offense, because it covers less and, therefore, is less likely to be
infringed, but it also is strong on defense because it is likely both to avoid the prior
art and to be supported by a sufficiently detailed disclosure, and, therefore, also is
less likely to be invalid.214
To be sure, a patentee’s offensive drive is strong, but it is also strongly
undercut by the defensive drive via the linkage through claim breadth.215 This is
because the costs of preparing a patent with claims of meaningful scope are
substantial, whereas an adjudication of invalidity destroys all private value of the
patent.216 The patentee’s drafting decisions before filing must take into
III.A.1. Therefore, patentees must always balance the time needed to write a sufficient disclosure
against the chance this time will allow for the creation of so-called “intervening art,” because it
came into existence between the date of invention and the date of filing.
211

Merges & Nelson, supra note 91, at 845 (exploring economic implications of varying
patent scope).
212

See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—
American Perspectives, 21 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499, 501 (1990), quoted in
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (1995) (Plager, J.,
dissenting, joined by Archer, C.J., and Rich & Lourie, JJ.), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Although
Judge Rich made these remarks in a discussion about the benefits of the present examination
system, they are even more germane to the model registration system.
213

See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 641, 644 (1967) (emphasis omitted) (responding to proposed legislation S. 1042, 90th
Cong. (1967) and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong. (1967) and President’s Comm’n on the Patent Sys., “To
Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts” in an Age of Exploding Technology (1966)).
214

Id. (explaining patentee’s dilemma, or “riddle”).

215

See supra notes 212–214 (discussing the linkage).

216

Although the filing fees paid to the Patent Office are relatively modest, the costs of
attorney and client time to draft a disclosure that will comply with the patent-obtaining
requirements can be well over ten times that amount. As of January 1, 2003, the basic filing fee is
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consideration several factors. First, compliance with the disclosure requirements,
when tested in litigation, looks to the disclosure made at filing.217 Second, if the
patentee amends the application that was originally filed, then the scope the
patentee may later be able to capture in an infringement suit through recourse to
the doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”) may be cabined by the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel, which is triggered by such amendments.218 Third,
because the best information about validity is most likely to be held by parties
other than the patentee,219 the patentee experiences substantial incentive either to
err on the side of narrowness or to obtain that information so the patent can be
drafted around it.220 It is this incentive for the patentee to make its own correct
determination of validity and scope before filing that helps explain the evidence
discussed above from Allison and Lemley that patentees themselves are making
decisions that tend to keep their own patent scope “just right” from a social
perspective.221
This view of what makes scope just right under the registration theory is
quite different from those under the reward, prospect, or rent dissipation theories.
$740, or $370 for what the Patent Office views as a “small entity.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a) (2003).
The attorney’s fees for preparing and prosecuting the application are described by Lemley as
follows:
Prosecuting patents is expensive. There is some disagreement on precisely how expensive it is, but
the general range of costs for prosecuting a patent from start to finish (including application and various
filing fees paid to the PTO, and attorney’s fees not only to prepare and file the application, but to respond
to office actions and continue prosecution through to issuance or abandonment) appears to be $10,000 to
$30,000 per patent. I have chosen a conservative average estimate of $20,000 per initial application
taken through prosecution. Much of this cost is front-loaded: it covers an attorney’s time in meeting with
the inventor, writing the application, and writing patent claims, as well as a substantial filing fee to the
PTO. Other costs are incurred on a piecemeal basis as prosecution progresses, and include both
attorney’s fees and PTO fees to file each new piece of paper, up to and including the issuance of the
patent itself. These cost averages include both patents that are ultimately issued and patent applications
that are ultimately rejected by the PTO without being revived.

Lemley, supra note 6, at 1498–99 (footnotes omitted) (collecting sources).
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See supra note 196 (discussing the disclosure rules).

218

See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25–34
(1997) (reaffirming the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a legal limit on DOE).
219

See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the many types of prior art that are in the hands of
those other than the patentee).
220

A patent claim that ends up covering any part of the prior art is invalid. See supra
notes 123–124. Under the registration theory, post-issuance procedures available to amend the
claims under the present examination system should be avoided to ensure that the patent applicant
has the strongest incentive possible to get right the document that is registered and published and
on which everyone will rely.
221

See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text (discussing the evidence).
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Importantly, scope that is just right under the registration theory is scope that is
determined using lowest administrative costs possible to do two things: (1) protect
verifiable investment-backed expectations by avoiding patenting of the prior art;
and (2) facilitate bargaining over, and avoidance of, the patent by ensuring the
application’s disclosure and claims combine to leave the patent scope as clear as
possible. Patent scope achieved this way does not simply depend upon trivial
decisions on the margin to file additional claims of different scope. Rather, each
claim can be thought to represent a class of potentially infringing members. Under
the patent-obtaining rules, that class must be adequately disclosed and none of its
members must have been within the prior art. Under hard-look systems, such
claims may have pernicious impact because they may be presumed valid although
actually likely to be proven invalid if challenged. Under soft-look systems,
especially the registration model, the private benefit an applicant would get from
strategic games involving the filing of excessive variation in claims decreases. At
the same time, for those claims that happen to have appropriate scope, the public
cost decreases and the public benefit increases. Indeed, the patentee’s private
efforts, at the time of drafting, to achieve the maximum scope allowable under the
patent-obtaining rules facilitates later evaluation of the patent’s potential validity
and infringement by potential transaction partners, competitors, and courts.222
Therefore, as suggested by the registration theory, there are a number of essential
registration aspects inherent in the present examination system and they help
minimize social costs.

IV. LESSONS FROM THE MODEL FOR THE PRESENT PATENT SYSTEM
The registration model and its accompanying registration theory show that
the present patent system, which is based on examination, in fact operates with
many registration aspects.223 Nevertheless, the registration theory shows how the
system could be improved by a number of reforms of varying severity. More
specifically, the registration theory elucidates the benefits of a number of reforms
relating to statutory subject matter and utility, DOE, deference to the Patent
Office, and post-issuance procedures, which could all be adopted without
switching to a fully soft-look system like the registration model.224 The
registration theory also elucidates the benefits of reforms relating to litigation of

222

The reforms discussed infra in Part IV.E help each of these parties use this
information, and the information relating to the prior art and infringement.
223
224

See supra Part III.

See infra Parts IV.A–D (discussing reforms relating to statutory subject matter and
utility, DOE, deference to the Patent Office, and post-issuance procedures).
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patents and the presumption of validity that essentially would have the effect of
switching to a soft-look system like the registration model.225

A. Reforms for Subject Matter and Utility
The § 101226 requirements of utility and statutory subject matter should be
amended to avoid the public choice and administrative costs they have inflicted
over the years.227 Both of these requirements have been used to invalidate patents

225

See infra Part IV.E (discussing reforms relating to litigation of patents and the
presumption of validity).
226

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (statutory subject matter and utility).

227

A variety of per se exclusions in patent law have been perceived. See, e.g., Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital
computer.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–18 (1980) (holding living organisms not
per se unpatentable); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1370–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (hub-and-spoke mutual fund accounting system is patentable subject
matter); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (computer system for
producing a smooth waveform on a raster display is patentable subject matter).
The central problem with these perceived exclusions is that they did not provide
workable distinctions ex ante between what would prospectively be considered the line between
the patentable and the unpatentable, leaving decisionmakers to entertain arguments about a special
exception in any case from anyone able to fund the attack. See supra note 80 (discussing some
public choice problems associated with this type of decision making). These ever-shifting sands
prevented some industries, like the computer software business, from gaining sufficient traction to
organize themselves into anything but industries characterized by a single large player—for
example, Microsoft. See Kieff, supra note 11, at 744 (the inability to obtain meaningful “patent
protection for software for such a large and important portion of the industry’s life may have
contributed to the continued unchallenged dominance of a huge entity like Microsoft”). The result
was bleak and remarkably reminiscent of the one described by Dickens:
At the Patent Office in Lincoln’s Inn, they made ‘a draft of the Queens bill’, of my invention, and a
‘docket of the bill’. I paid five pound, ten, and six, for this. They ‘engrossed two copies of the bill;
one for the Signet Office, and one for the Privy-Seal Office’. I paid one pound, seven, and six, for
this. Stamp duty over and above, three pound. The Engrossing Clerk of the same office engrossed the
Queen’s bill for signature. I paid him one pound, one. Stamp-duty again, one pound, ten. I was next to
take the Queen’s bill to the Attorney-General again, and get it signed again. I took it, and paid five
pound more. I fetched it away, and took it to the Home Secretary again. He sent it to the Queen again.
She signed it again. I paid seven pound thirteen, and six, more, for this. I had been over a month at
Thomas Joy’s. I was quite wore out, patience and pocket.

Charles Dickens, A Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent, in Charles Dickens and the ‘Poor Man’s Tale of a
Patent’ 15, 18–19, 29 (Jeremy Phillips ed., 1984) (including appendices about the “circumlocution
office” described to be “(as everybody knows without being told) the most important Department
under Government”).
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or deny patents based on arguments that make no sense when mapped onto the
patent system.228 They are vestiges of reward theories and are unworkable.
Although § 101 of the statute is generally viewed as setting forth two
requirements for patentability—utility and subject matter—the case law229
provides some authority for the proposition that this section is either merely
prefatory, or designed to rule in what years of case law had tried to rule out.
Section 101 provides in its entirety:
§ 101. Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.230

During a surprisingly active exchange of cases between the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”) (the predecessor
court to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) involving the famous
cases of In re Bergy and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the anatomy of this statute was
carefully dissected.231 In 1979, the C.C.P.A. in Bergy decided that “in 1952
Congress voiced its intent to consider the novelty of an invention under § 102
where it is first made clear what the statute means by ‘new’, notwithstanding that
this requirement is first named in § 101.”232 The same reasoning would support
the view that the word “utility” should be considered under the disclosure
requirements of § 112, such as “enablement,” despite that it is first named in
§ 101 as well.
If a statutory construction approach is unconvincing, a review of theory
may be. The utility requirement should be low because the requirement itself
serves no economic purpose. A useless patent will not be infringed.233 Moreover,
for a patent that lacks utility because of a lack of practical application, at least the
information published in the patent teaches something good (and again no one
228

See, e.g., infra notes 236, 240 and accompanying text.

229

See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text.

230

35 U.S.C. § 101.

231

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307–18; Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959–64 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
(Rich, J.), dismissed as moot, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (companion case to Chakrabarty).
232
233

596 F.2d at 961.

Kieff, supra note 11, at 721–22 (showing why the utility requirement is itself useless
and why lack-of-utility arguments are most generously viewed as non-infringement of a properly
construed claim so as to avoid the apparently inconsistent position of a defendant showing the
activity to be of sufficient use to have prompted the infringement lawsuit while arguing that they
are of no use).

Kieff

THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS

53

will infringe). If there is lack of utility due to the inventor getting the science or
engineering underlying the alleged invention wrong, then the information
published is valuable in teaching others what not to do. Finally, a patent of
uncertain commercial utility provides incentives for the patentee to license
broadly.234
The case law controlled by the 1995 decision of the Federal Circuit in In re
Brana has largely adopted this view and today, as a matter of positive law, courts
give a great deal of deference to a patent applicant’s assertion of utility.235 To some
extent this case law may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in
Brenner v. Manson.236 Nevertheless, because a utility requirement would not
protect any investment-backed expectations and proponents of a strong requirement
fail to give any test for utility that is administrable, the registration theory suggests
the requirement should simply be abandoned.237
The statutory subject matter requirement should also be low—fixed at
“anything under the sun made by man”238—to avoid both the problems of setting
categories of subject matter and the inevitable wasteful costs that would be spent
by parties near the margins between categories.239 The charge that the law must
234

Id. at 726 (discussing the powerful incentive to license broadly that is caused by risks of
commercialization, such as those that would obtain where commercial utility is uncertain).
235

According to the Federal Circuit, a two-step analysis is required:

[First, the Patent Office or alleged infringer] has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively
correct assertion of utility in the disclosure. [Second,] [o]nly after the [challenger] provides evidence
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the
burden shift to the applicant to [prove utility].

Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
236

See 383 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1966) (holding patent invalid for lack of utility, perhaps
because there was no specific commercial use of the products produced by the claimed process,
stating “a patent is not a hunting license”); see also Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 707–27
(recognizing the inconsistency and discussing modern treatment).
237

The prospect, rent dissipation, commercialization, and registration theories would each
see the granting of a hunting license to be entirely appropriate either as an effort to coordinate the
hunt to avoid the risk of accidental shootings, to avoid racing, or because there are no investmentbacked expectations to protect.
238

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep.
No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
239

For example, consider that during the prior case law when software was perceived to
be unpatentable, applicants would simply claim it “in a box” or “on a disk” by drafting claims to a
general purpose computer (a thing) programmed a certain way or a magnetically recordable
medium (again a thing) on which a certain message had been recorded. For a detailed discussion
of the evolution in this area, see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 728–828. For more on the
problems of per se categories of unpatentable subject matter, see Allison & Tiller, supra note 208.
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change to accommodate new subject matters for which patents are being sought
makes little sense. Among the many legal regimes that might possibly face a
charge of not being designed to deal with new technologies, the patent system
must have the best defense precisely because it is the one system expressly
designed with such unforeseen technologies in mind.240 Indeed, technologies that
are so foreseeable as to be obvious are not patentable in view of the system’s most
basic patentability requirement: that the claimed invention not be in the prior art.
As a result, we should, at a minimum, avoid adopting the suggestion by some
critics that we develop special rules to accommodate particular areas of patentable
subject matter where protection is only recently being sought, such as
biotechnology, computer software, and finance. We perhaps also should be
clearer in holding that the law is firmly settled on this issue by expressly stating
that statutory subject matter raises no distinct hurdle to patentability.241

B. Reforms for the Doctrine of Equivalents
An understanding of incentive for individual patentees to get patent scope
“just right”242 provides some guidance on the ongoing battle over the DOE, which
allows a patentee to win an infringement suit against something that is not
literally covered by the claims.243 Allowing the patentee recourse to this doctrine
is bad in that it weakens the important self-disciplining effect described above;
eliminating the doctrine would be good in that it would accentuate this
incentive.244

240

The majority opinion of the sharply divided Supreme Court embraced this view in
Chakrabarty: “This is especially true in the field of patent law. A rule that unanticipated
inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law that
anticipation undermines patentability.” 447 U.S. at 316.
241

As the Federal Circuit recognized in 1998 in State Street Bank:

The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which
of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter—but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular,
its practical utility. Section 101 specifies that statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other
“conditions and requirements” of Title 35, including novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of
disclosure and notice.

149 F.3d at 1375 (footnote omitted).
242

See supra notes 210–221 and accompanying text.

243

See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24–41 (discussing the doctrine of equivalents
and its limits).
244

Recent work by Wagner makes a similar argument to justify cabining the reach of
DOE. See Wagner, supra note 50, at 244.
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Importantly, this criticism of the DOE is not merely driven by concerns
about absolute crispness, or advantages of rules over standards.245 Rather, the core
argument is a matter of comparative institutional economics.
To understand the intuition of the argument it may help to first consider
that the DOE is structurally at odds with the basic approach to claims under the
present positive law rules of the patent system, which together yield an approach
known as “peripheral claiming”—as distinct from “central claiming”—in which
the function of the patent claim is not to set forth the heart of the protected subject
matter but rather to set forth its outer bounds.246 A determination of infringement
under a central claiming approach requires the court to determine the heart of the
invention and whether the putative infringement is close enough to that heart to
justify a judgment of infringement. A determination under peripheral claiming
requires the court to determine only the outer bounds of the claim. Anything
within those bounds infringes and anything outside does not. The DOE in the
present patent system, even though not provided for in the statute, is an odd
exception to the peripheral nature of our present peripheral claiming system
precisely because it allows the patentee to capture something outside of the
claim.247
Although the DOE has some general intuitive attraction because it gives
some flexibility, the registration theory shows how the patentee can achieve even
greater flexibility in a manner that is not only less costly to the patentee but also
to all third parties by simply drafting a better patent disclosure at the outset.
Under the disclosure rules of patent law, the patentee at the time of filing can draft
a disclosure that will support claims of varying scope.248
It may be possible that the information-forcing benefits of a system with
no DOE would be outweighed by the added costs it may encourage some patent
applicants to incur as a precaution. But, on a per-patent basis, the direct costs to
patentees of this drafting effort (largely legal fees) are substantially less than those
associated with litigating DOE issues later in court. In addition, the indirect costs
of having to decide whether this extra flexibility on scope is worth such direct
245

For more on the general debate about rules over standards, see supra note 17.

246

For more on peripheral claiming, see F. Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA,
in Perspectives on Properties, supra note 56 at 125, 135. See also supra Part III.C. (discussing
claims under the present system).
247

This may be one reason why the principal drafter of the present system, Judge Rich,
joined two of the dissenting opinions in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. that
objected to the DOE. 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (1995) (Plager, J., dissenting, joined by Archer, C.J., and
Rich & Lourie, JJ.), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dissenting, joined by Rich
& Plager, JJ.).
248

See infra notes 251–258 and accompanying text.
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costs will be cabined to some extent by the small size of the potential gain from
avoiding the direct costs themselves. Even if it turned out that putative patentees,
on average, do not make at least roughly appropriate decisions about which of
their own patents deserve more or less attention at the drafting stage, a significant
moral hazard problem certainly would arise if decisions on application of the
DOE were understood to turn on this type of error by individual patentees.
Moreover, the DOE imposes substantial litigation costs on competitors of the
patentee. The general uncertainty arising out of the DOE can also chill business
transactions of all sorts, including commercialization efforts by competitors and
downstream developers as well as by business partners of even the patentee.
It also may be possible that the information-forcing benefits of a system
with no DOE would be outweighed by other costs to the system. One major
component of these countervailing costs will be the decreased commercialization
benefits to society that would be associated with those inventions protected by
patents whose patentees, at the time of filing, elected to spend too little on patent
drafting. But once again, a significant moral hazard problem certainly would arise
if decisions on application of the DOE were understood to turn on this type of
error by individual patentees as well.
Alternatively, as Douglas Lichtman suggests, information forcing may be
of no benefit if, at the time of filing, the patentee may not be able to draft an
application that could convey appropriate patent scope given the inevitably
changing state of technological vocabularies.249 But to the extent it suggests that a
patentee somehow deserves the broader scope captured by the DOE, this view of
what is an appropriate patent scope would seem to be based on a version of a
reward theory and would fail to account for the focus on minimizing social cost
that is central to positive law rules for patentability—especially the disclosure
rules—as elucidated by the registration theory.250
In addition, it is not clear whether such concerns about changes in
technology actually obtain, as a practical matter, under a peripheral claming
system. Under a peripheral claiming approach, each claim can be viewed as a
simple logical list in which each word, or element, in the claim is considered a
required item in the list. This list of elements can be compared against the
allegedly infringing product or process in much the same way it was compared
against the prior art in Tables 1 and 2.251 Patent infringement occurs when each
249

See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel 27–28 (Univ.
of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 200, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=455380.
250

See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing what makes scope just right
under the registration theory). See generally supra Part III.
251

See supra notes 146 (describing Table 1) and 169 (describing Table 2) and
accompanying text.
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and every element of the claim can be found in the allegedly infringing product or
process.252 According to such a comparison, the more elements there are, the
harder it is to infringe. Instead of trying to determine and then recite in the claim
every particular use by potential future infringers, a prudent patentee under such a
system tries to determine the general nature of these potential uses and then
recites them as a class in the claim. For example, rather than drafting a claim that
recites, among other elements, a list of specific expected fastener technologies
such as nails, screws, and Velcro®, a prudent patentee might recite “a fastener” as
a claim element and then elsewhere in the patent provide a careful disclosure of
what is meant by this term including a qualitative description and representative
examples.253
This approach to claiming and drafting deals well with even unknowable
future technologies. Put simply, this is the job of a good patent lawyer and one
reason why patents are legal documents drafted by lawyers for interpretation by
judges and lawyers, not technical documents evaluated by peer review.254 The
standard for satisfaction of the disclosure rules’ written description requirement is
merely whether the disclosure as filed conveys to a PHOSITA255 that the inventor
had possession of the claimed invention at that time; ipsis verbis disclosure is not
needed.256 As a result, a prudent drafter easily can employ claim elements that are
disclosed to be a “genus and its constituent species” (or a class of constituent
members) without having to identify in the disclosure every single species (or
member), as long as the disclosure provides a clear indication of how to determine
membership in the genus (or class), which can be shown through the analogy to a
path through a forest marked by certain trees:
It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze marks on the
trees. It is no help in finding a trail . . . to be confronted simply by a large

252

For a detailed discussion of the law of infringement, see generally Chisum et al., supra
note 6, at 829–73. Also recall the maxim linking the tests for infringement and anticipation. See
supra note 124.
253

In contrast, under a central claiming system, there can be a premium to reciting in the
claim examples of the particular items that are likely to be infringing because, unless expressly
mentioned, such items are unlikely to be considered sufficiently central to the claim.
254

See Giles S. Rich, Foreword to Chisum et al., supra note 6, at iii, v–vi (noting that it is
anachronistic to view the claims as being drafted by inventors rather than by patent attorneys and
agents).
255

As discussed supra note 164 and accompanying text, a “PHOSITA” is a “person
having ordinary skill in the art.”
256

Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Clevenger, J.).
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number of unmarked trees. Appellants are pointing to trees. We are looking for
blaze marks which single out particular trees.257

To be sure, the crafting of a disclosure that complies with these rules may itself be
difficult; and no disclosure will be perfect. Recent opinions of the various Federal
Circuit judges evidence a particular tension about whether this disclosure standard
is so fixed, and whether it can be satisfied.258 Thus, the disclosure rules
257

Id. (quoting In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 994–95 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J.)). The
well-known biotechnology cases of Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Fiers v. Revel,
and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. gave some practical teaching about
how to satisfy this standard: the applicant must give details about the physical or chemical
structure of the claimed invention; merely describing it by function does not suffice. Lilly, 119
F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168–71 (Fed Cir. 1993); Amgen, 927
F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The furniture and computer cases of Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
Berkline Corp. and Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc. teach that this standard is not technology
specific. Gentry, 134 F.3d 1473, 1478–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (sofa recliner); Lockwood, 107 F.3d
1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (computer reservation system).
258

In September 2002, in PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chemical Co., the Federal Circuit
repeated that the test for compliance with the written description requirement requires a comparison
of the claims as issued against the disclosure as originally filed, and held invalid a claim not
supported by the disclosure of the unamended application. 304 F.3d 1235, 1247–48 (Fed. Cir.
2002). And in October 2002, in All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Products, Inc., the
court reiterated, as in Fujikawa, that the test does not require the disclosure to provide the identical
words of the claims, ipsis verbis; the test only requires disclosure to convey the substance of the
claim to a PHOSITA. 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But, in January 2003, the court in Amgen
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., showed a substantial split in views on the written description
requirement. Compare 314 F.3d 1313, 1330–34 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2003) (majority opinion), with id.
at 1358–61 (Clevenger, J., dissenting in part). The majority opinion, written by Judge Paul Michel
and joined by Judge Alvin Schall, considered at some length a number of specific written
description arguments, but the common theme it reiterated for each was relatively uncontroversial:
that the test for compliance is measured against the actual subject matter as claimed, not against its
precursors, parts, or gist (as would be the case under a central claiming system). Id. at 1330–34. To
the extent the dissent was merely disagreeing on the facts and suggesting that some additional
necessary disclosure could have been delivered but was not, the opinion is not doctrinally
remarkable. But the language of Judge Raymond Clevenger’s dissenting opinion seems to express
concern that the majority’s approach elevates form over substance and would allow the crafty
patentee to avoid the need to disclose as much detail by drafting a broader claim. Id. at 1358–61
(Clevenger, J., dissenting in part). But under the genus/species approach discussed earlier, it flows
as a matter of logic that less detail is needed to describe a broader genus. Describing the genus
“houses” requires less detail than describing the genus “Victorian houses.” That is what the term
“broader” means. If the written description were as hard to satisfy as this opinion seems to suggest,
then it would raise all of the same objections raised earlier against the information-forcing benefits
of a no-DOE system. Finally, other important divisions over the written description requirement are
also evident in the court’s recent opinions on this topic. See, e.g., MOBA, B.V. v. Diamond
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (including a per curiam opinion from a panel
comprising Judges Randall Rader, Schall, and William Bryson, as well as separate concurring
opinions by Judges Rader and Bryson), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 646 (2003) (mem.); Enzo Biochem,
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themselves to some extent raise many of the same concerns as the DOE. In the
final analysis of the tension between the effort to achieve flexibility through either
the DOE or the disclosure requirements, the registration theory’s contribution is to
highlight, as a matter of comparative institutional economics, why reliance on the
disclosure rules is less likely to trigger these important concerns as extensively.

C. Reforms for Deference to the Patent Office
The patentees’ incentive to make their own correct determination of
validity also raises serious issues for some of the present administrative law
doctrines relating to the Patent Office.259 Because the Patent Office regulations
governing a patentee’s duty to disclose information material to validity provides
no added incentive for the patentee to seek out such information,260 they may be
unnecessary under either a hard-look or a soft-look system. In addition, deference
to the Patent Office’s decisions on validity as being well-informed is questionable
because the Patent Office is not the lower cost provider of information relating to
validity.261 Moreover, to the extent decisions on validity can be made for so-called
legal reasons that are based on facts, there is real potential for social costs relating
to public choice and administrative problems in shaping those reasons and how
they are applied.262
The costs of a hard-look system are, therefore, made worse by the rule of
deference. Information about validity over the prior art needed to catch potentially
Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002), replaced on reh’g, 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (including a majority opinion authored by Judge Alan Lourie, an opinion concurring in denial
of petition for rehearing en banc by Judge Lourie, in which Judge Pauline Newman joined, an
opinion concurring in denial of rehearing en banc by Judge Newman, an opinion concurring in
denial of rehearing en banc by Judge Timothy Dyk, an opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc by Judge Rader, in which Judges Arthur Gajarsa and Richard Linn joined, and an opinion
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc by Judge Linn, in which Judges Rader and Gajarsa
joined). The same objections raised earlier against the information-forcing benefits of a no-DOE
system are again triggered to the extent all of these diverse opinions create uncertainty in the
eventual application of the written description requirement.
259

These include deference on questions of law and on issues of fact. See supra note 69
(discussing administrative law aspects of the patent system).
260

See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(holding that patentee has no duty to search).
261

See Kerr, supra note 69, at 127–33 (criticizing arguments for deference to the Patent
Office); see also In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574–79 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reviewing reasons for
not applying enhanced deference to the Patent Office).
262

Where the statute has provided the standards against which all claims are to be
measured, a shifting in the standards on a case by case basis will return us to the bleak result
discussed supra note 227.
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pernicious invalid, or bad, patents is better provided through litigation. In
addition, low deference to the agency protects good patents by leaving less room
for incorrect decisions on validity grounded in improper application of putative
legal rules such as utility, subject matter, and the so-called requirement for
invention, each of which has occurred in the past, as discussed earlier.263 As a
result, many of the proposed shifts towards a hard-look system should be avoided
in part because they have a greater potential for public choice and administrative
problems, especially under the present regime of heightened deference to the
Patent Office.264
263

See supra Part IV.A.

264

See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (Administrative Procedures Act
requires deference to fact-finding by the Patent Office). Compare Dethmers Mfg. Co. v.
Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 293 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J., dissenting)
(questioning court’s decision not to give the Patent Office deference on the interpretation of its
own regulations), with Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding
that the Patent Office should not receive Chevron deference on legal questions because “Congress
has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power”).
Especially under a regime of deference, the public choice and administrative problems
essentially become those associated with reward theories. Deference to the agency simply
provides incentives for individual parties to argue to the agency for policy shifts that target a
particular patent or set of patents. This is exactly the move the computer hardware companies
made during the late 1960s and early ’70s to get the PTO and the Solicitor General’s Office to
oppose patents on computer software. As described by Judge Rich in dissent in In re Johnston in
1974:
I find it more significant to contemplate the identities of the troops lined up for battle in Benson and
observe which side obtained the victory. On the one side was the Government, against patenting
programs or software, supported by the collective forces of major hardware (i.e., computer)
manufacturers and their representative associations who, for economic reasons, did not want patents
granted on programs for their machines. On the other side was Benson et al. and their assignee and
assorted lawyers and legal groups who were in favor of patent protection for programs or software.
The anti-patenting forces won the victory . . . .

502 F.2d 765, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (Rich, J., dissenting) (discussing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). The
majority opinion in Benson relies heavily on a 1966 report by a presidential commission on the
patent system, which has been described by former Patent Office Commissioner Gerald
Mossinghoff:
[T]he 1966 report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System was largely a battle between
AT&T, which strongly supported the patenting of software, and IBM, which bitterly opposed it.
IBM’s position as a mainframe manufacturer and seller was that software should be unpatentable and
should be given away free of charge. AT&T, as primarily a software developer, felt precisely the
opposite.

Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of the Software Patent
Saga, 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 307, 316 n.63 (1999) (citing interview with the Honorable Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, in Arlington, Va. (Sept. 13,
1999)). As such special exceptions stack up over time, the PTO may indeed resemble the
“circumlocution office” Dickens described supra note 227.
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D. Reforms for Post-Issuance Procedures
Although the registration theory elucidates advantages of soft-look
registration systems over hard-look examination systems, a number of middleground approaches might also be considered. These may offer the informational
advantages of registration while trying to mitigate the high costs of full civil
litigation through various post-issuance procedures to challenge an issued patent
but conducted before the Patent Office. Approaches that have been tried include
those called ex parte reexamination, inter partes reexamination, and inter partes
opposition.265
Although ex parte reexamination was introduced into the patent system in
1980 to help address the concerns about the pernicious impact of issued patent
claims whose validity is questionable,266 it turns out not to work as a costeffective means for removing such claims. This is because it only involves the
same parties responsible for allowing the claim in the first instance: the applicant
and the Patent Office.267 In 1999, inter partes reexamination was introduced to
allow for more meaningful participation by third parties.268 To prevent patentees
265

For a discussion of these various procedures, see Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 128–

60.
266

H.R. Rep. No. 96–1307, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6462–63 (“Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the validity of issued
patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation.”).
267

The ex parte nature of the process essentially means that a third party’s involvement is
limited to the initial request for reexamination. Absent meaningful involvement, this party is not
able to present effectively to the decisionmaker the very information relating to validity that the
registration theory shows is most likely to be in the hands of some third party. Whatever patent
claims emerge from the reexamination will again be presumed valid. Therefore, most third parties
have rationally elected to hold any pertinent information relating to validity for later use at trial to
undermine the presumption of validity that issued with the patent. Indeed, ex parte reexamination
has become a strategic tool for patentees to strengthen effectively their presumption of validity
against arguments they suspect may be raised by competitors in litigation. If necessary, the patentee
may narrow the claim during reexamination to avoid the newly discovered art, whereas during
litigation the court must generally either hold the claim valid or invalid as written. See U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2001, 106 tbl.1, 119
tbls.13A–B (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001 (for the year
2001, 150 of the 296 ex parte reexaminations were requested by third parties and only one was an
inter partes reexamination). But see Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (adopting a rule of claim interpretation that is not all or nothing and instead
merely narrows the claim scope).
268

American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601–4608, 113
Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-567 to -572 (1999) (adding new sections, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318,
providing for optional inter partes reexamination procedure). For an excellent review of the
strategic concerns raised by this new procedure, see generally Robert T. Pous & Charles L. Gholz,
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from having their patents held up in perpetual reexamination, however, this new
procedure estops the third party, including the real party in interest, from relitigating anything that was or could have been decided during the
reexamination.269 As a result, third parties who are not yet sure they have the best
argument may rationally elect to save it for use in later litigation rather than use it
and lose it through the more sterile process of administrative adjudication, which
does not allow for consideration of non-documentary forms of evidence.270 Inter
partes opposition proceedings are used in Europe and allow more types of
evidence than the administrative procedures available for reexamination in the
United States, but these must be filed within a short time after the patent has
issued.271
Will Inter Partes Reexamination Be Embraced by Third Parties as an Alternative to Litigation?, 7
Intell. Prop. Today 37 (2000).
269

See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2000) (“[Third party] is estopped from asserting at a later time, in
any civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, the
invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground which the thirdparty requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings.
[Estoppel] does not prevent the assertion of invalidity based on newly discovered prior art
unavailable to the third-party requester and the Patent and Trademark Office at the time of the inter
partes reexamination proceedings.”); American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 § 4607 (the “1999
Act”) (“Any party who requests an inter partes reexamination under section 311 of title 35, United
States Code, is estopped from challenging at a later time, in any civil action, any fact determined
during the process of such reexamination, except with respect to a fact determination later proved to
be erroneous based on information unavailable at the time of the inter partes reexamination
decision.”).
Importantly, although third parties originally were not allowed under the provisions of the
1999 Act to appeal from the Patent Office to the Federal Circuit, this right of appeal was added in
2002. Patent and Trademark Authorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13106, 2003
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 1899, 1900–01 (rewriting § 315(b) to expressly provide for this right of
appeal to the Federal Circuit through the provisions of §§ 141–144 and rewriting § 134 to delete
the express prohibition for this right of appeal); see 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) (“A third-party
requester . . . may appeal under the provisions of section 134, and may appeal under the provisions
of sections 141 through 144, with respect to any final decision favorable to the patentability of any
original or proposed amended or new claim of the patent . . . .”); id. § 134(c) (“A third-party
requester in an inter partes proceeding may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences from the final decision of the primary examiner favorable to the patentability of any
original or proposed amended or new claim of a patent, having once paid the fee for such
appeal.”).
270

Unlike litigation, reexamination does not allow for subpoenas, interrogatories,
depositions, live testimony, and cross-examination.
271

See European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 99(1), available at http://www.
european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (opposition must be
filed “[w]ithin nine months from the publication of mention of the grant of the European patent”);
see also European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office pt. D,
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An alternative approach might be to include a special provision for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to allow anyone who has sufficient interest, but
not necessarily reasonable apprehension of suit, to bring an action in court
challenging the validity of the patent.272 This would give access to better
procedures and would not have the time restrictions of the opposition
proceedings, but would then subject patentees to more potential challenges.273 In
the final analysis, this approach begins to look most like the registration model,
which in turn raises a number of litigation conduct issues that are discussed
below.

E. Reforms for Litigation
To be sure, the balancing effect on claim scope that draws the attention of
most patent critics is imperfect and must be further explored. These critics are
correct that many issued patents are held invalid through federal court
litigation.274 But the number of patents held invalid has decreased over time.275
Critics are also correct that, although many issued patents may be invalid but also

ch. I, at 1, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/index.htm (setting
forth procedural guidelines for opposition proceedings).
272

See Thomas G. Pasternak & Karen J. Nelson, Side Bar: Declaratory Judgment
Jurisdiction: A Dance on the Razor’s Edge, in Principles of Patent Law, supra note 6, at 1043,
1043–49 (reviewing the standard for obtaining declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases
under present system). Creating such a statutory cause of action to invalidate federally issued
patents would help alleviate the problems posed by the constitutional “case and controversy”
requirement from Article III, which gave rise to the “reasonable apprehension of suit” prong of the
generally applicable test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction. See id. An alternative way to
conceptualize this cause of action is the action to quiet title in the real property setting. (Thanks to
Henry Smith for this suggestion).
273

As elucidated by Lemley, one advantage in allowing more time to pass is that it allows
more information about society’s interest in the patent to accrue, thereby decreasing the likelihood of
error associated with ex ante efforts to predict which patents should receive close attention. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text (citing Lemley, supra note 6, at 1497).
274

See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 Am. Intell. Prop. Law. Ass’n Q.J. 185, 205–07 (1998) (reporting that about
46% of all patents litigated to a final judgment on validity issues are held invalid, including
decisions on appeal and at summary judgment); Moore, supra note 122, at 390 tbl.4 (reporting that
33% of patents are held invalid at trial).
275

See Gloria K. Koenig, Patent Invalidity: A Statistical and Substantive Analysis 4-16 to
-23 (rev. ed. 1980) (reporting invalidity numbers for the twenty-five year period from 1953
through 1977 as averaging 65.7% for the courts of appeals and 57.8% for the district courts); see
also Allison & Lemley, supra note 274, at 206 n.53.
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irrelevant to the market,276 some may be invalid and relevant in a bad way—
through their in terrorem effect—without ever reaching litigation.277 This leaves
alleged infringers to decide among several options: federal court litigation to get
the patent adjudicated invalid, obtaining permission from the patentee, or not
operating in a way that allegedly infringes. The question raised by such patents is
how best to decrease the social costs of allowing the alleged infringer to make and
implement the socially optimal decision.
According to the registration theory, these social costs may be decreased
by use of tools in the proposed registration model that are slightly modified
versions of two recent legal trends in the case law of the present system.278 These
tools operate to decrease incentives for strategic behavior and increase incentives
for sharing information, thereby helping ensure that the alleged infringer is able to
make and implement the socially optimal decision on the choice discussed
above.279
276

This is the important insight explored by Lemley. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
277

Not all potential defendants would have elected to spend the money it took to
withstand the preliminary injunction in the one-click shopping case discussed supra notes 1–4 and
accompanying text.
278

These tools come from the general debate over the so-called “American Rule” and the
so-called “British Rule” of litigation. As Abramowicz aptly explains:
Loser pays is often called the British rule, though variants of the British rule exist. On the economic
choice among the various alternatives, see Richard D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Lit. 1067 (1989); John J. Donohue III,
Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093 (1991); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279
(1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61 (1971); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-ofPrevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. Legal Stud. 519 (1998); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973); I.P.L. P’ng, Strategic
Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J. Econ. 539 (1983); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement,
and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
Legal Stud. 55 (1982); Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal
Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 345 (1990); Mark S. Stein, The English Rule
with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Appraisal, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 603 (1995); and
Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on
Settlement Incentives, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2154 (1992).

Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes 98 n.548 (2001) (working paper, available online at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/01-29.pdf; this footnote did not appear in the
published version of the paper, see Abramowicz, supra note 29).
279

Neither of these tools was present during the brief window in our history when a true
registration system was in use. The registration system lasted for forty-three years, from 1793 to
1836. Indeed, it was not until the Patent Act of 1870 that emphasis was placed on the claim. See
Chisum et al., supra note 6, at 19–21.
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The first tool arises from an important innovation in Federal Circuit case
law that can be used to decrease incentives for strategic behavior by patentees.
Despite the critics’ view of the Federal Circuit as a court that is unduly propatentee, the Federal Circuit has led the charge in Rule 11 sanctions in cases such
as Judin v. United States, where a discretionary ruling of no sanctions was
vacated in 1997 with instructions to award appropriate sanctions against a
patentee, and its trial and appellate counsel.280 Such disciplining of errant
patentees also may be achieved with other similar legal devices including 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (counsel’s liability for vexatious litigation), and 35 U.S.C. § 285
(attorney fees for exceptional cases).281 Importantly, Judin involved the patentee’s
failure to conduct a pre-filing investigation on infringement. Under a system like
the proposed registration model, such a disciplining device might also be
extended to curb patentees’ failure to conduct pre-filing investigations on validity.
The second tool arises from a highly evolved body of law in the patent
area that can operate to punish clients and their lawyers for reliance on
unsatisfactory opinions of counsel.282 The standards for opinions of counsel used
by alleged infringers to insulate themselves from liability could be applied to
potential plaintiff patentees before they are allowed to bring an action claiming
liability. This would improve a system like the proposed registration model by
spreading the costs of validity determinations among patentees and alleged
infringers. The cost-shifting effects discussed above will provide incentives for
patentees and likely infringers to exchange information about the strength of their
respective cases, thereby somewhat mitigating the risk of duplicative
expenditures. This effect is enhanced by the patentee’s interest in communicating
with alleged infringers so as to make the alleged infringement appear willful and
thereby win treble damages.283 The essential insight of the registration theory here
is that requiring the patentee also to have a good faith belief about patent validity
makes this interest in communicating symmetrical—potential infringers will have
a similar incentive to communicate validity information to patentees.
Although implementation of these tools would not be a trivial matter, it is
conceptually not that difficult. The market for opinions of counsel for both
280

See 110 F.3d 780, 783–85 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing, for abuse of discretion, a
judgment of no sanctions under Rule 11 against patentee and its counsel).
281

28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).

282

See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 184, 194–96 (D. Del.
1997) (chastising authoring counsel by name while affirming award of treble damages for willful
infringement because opinion of counsel was so plainly deficient), aff’d, 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
283

See Pasternak and Nelson, supra note 272, at 1043–49 (showing how such
communications can be conducted without creating declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
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patentees and competitors that is present under the existing system would grow.
Cost-sharing techniques would likely evolve, in which groups of interested parties
could focus upon a given patent’s potential validity or infringement,284 rating
organizations might arise,285 private bounties for pertinent prior art might be
offered to increase the information content of opinions,286 and shares in potential
costs and profits of litigation could be sold.287
Although ultimately the subject of an empirical question for further
research, the costs associated with these reform proposals are likely to be less than
the costs under the existing system—costs associated with those pernicious issued
patents presumed to be valid but likely to be held invalid if tested in court.288 The
combined effect would be positive in several respects. For those patents that are
pernicious under the present regime because of the litigation and in terrorem costs
they impose on third parties, the proposed reforms would allow third parties to
bear only the lower costs associated with the opinion markets, including costs and
284

These might include formal trade associations or informal groupings of particular
people or firms.
285

The securities markets provide a wealth of examples of fee-based rating organizations,
such as Standard & Poor’s .
286

At least one effort to offer bounties for prior art as a way to help invalidate certain
patents has been tried by a company known as BountyQuest. See, e.g., Cade Metz, Has Jeff Bezos
Patented Email Discussion Groups? (Mar. 5, 2003), at http://www.pcmag.com/article2
/0,4149,916103,00.asp (discussing ironic role of Amazon.com’s Jeff Bezos in founding of the
BountyQuest company).
287

Each of these techniques is used to varying degrees under the existing patent system
and under the existing securities registration system upon which the registration model is based.
See supra Part II (discussing registration model and its connection to the securities system). I am
particularly indebted to Michael Abramowicz, Bernard Black, Joe Grundfest, Arie Michelsohn,
and Troy Paredes for conversations on these techniques.
288

Although the reforms are likely to lead to some duplication in the costs associated
with searching the art and writing opinions, they will avoid much of the costs under the present
system that are associated with litigation or its in terrorem effect. See supra note 277 and
accompanying text (discussing these costs). In addition, a broadening of the market for opinions of
counsel for both patentees and competitors will help resolve several of the difficult questions
associated with opinions of counsel for potential infringers under the present system. For example,
the Federal Circuit recently decided to consider en banc the role of adverse inferences when
attorney-client privilege or work product immunity is asserted to prevent disclosure of an opinion
of counsel and when no opinion has been offered in a case. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The
privilege and immunity problems are sharpest when they relate to opinions by litigating counsel,
and the presence of a broader market for opinions will make it less likely that the pertinent opinion
will happen to be from litigating counsel. The problem of no opinion similarly will be mitigated as
the broader market for opinions makes them more widely and cheaply available.
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benefits of the fee-shifting techniques. For those patents that have proper scope,289
the proposed reforms would allow patentees to have essentially the same costs as
under the present system associated with patent drafting and litigation, except that
the costs of opinions will decrease slightly (or quality improve slightly) as the
market for them becomes more developed.290 Finally, one effect that may be seen
as positive or negative, depending on point of view, is that there will be a slight
decrease in the value of all patents due to the costs to patentees associated with
the new need to litigate their own affirmative validity cases. Interestingly, all of
these effects combine to yield a system that may be comparatively advantageous
over the present system for small players in particular for several reasons: it will
save them from the in terrorem effect of junk patents, it will save them their own
patent prosecution costs, and they will have ready access to markets to facilitate
with funding or strategic partnerships in their own litigation and
commercialization efforts when needed. Therefore, according to the registration
theory, we should adjust our present system to be more like the registration model
by adopting the proposed reforms of weakened or no presumption of validity, fee
shifting, and enhanced reliance on opinions of counsel (for both patentees and
competitors) to cabin the very pernicious effects explored by advocates of hardlook approaches.291
289

For more on what is meant by proper scope, see supra note 222 and accompanying

text.
290

In addition, under the full registration model, the private costs as well as the public
administrative costs associated with patent prosecution and examination would be eliminated for
all patents.
291

The reforms proposed here stand in rather stark contrast to several of the
recommendations that the Federal Trade Commission offered in its report from the hearings
discussed supra in note 5. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance
of Competition and Patent Law and Policy 1–18 (2003), at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). Some of the FTC
recommendations, such as publication of patents, make great sense under the registration theory.
See id. at 15–16 (Recommendation 7). Some, such as elimination of the substantive presumption
of validity, and post-grant review of patents, may be consistent with the registration model if
properly implemented. See id. at 7–10 (Recommendations 1–2). But, for the reasons explored
throughout this Article, under the registration theory many should be avoided, such as a change in
the patent-obtaining rules relating to nonobviousness, utility, and subject matter, as well as the
vague concern about economic impact, a change in the patent enforcement rules relating to notice
and so-called prior user rights, increased funding for the Patent Office, more involved
examination, and increased deference to Patent Office decisions. See id. at 10–17
(Recommendations 3–6, 8–10).
Interestingly, the FTC recommendations very closely track data recently gathered and
reported by Iain M. Cockburn of the Boston University School of Management and the National
Bureau of Economic Research and Rebecca Henderson of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Sloan School and also of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This
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CONCLUSION
Patent law can operate to minimize social costs, including those typically
associated with information, administration, public choice, races for a common
prize, and bargaining. The case for an alternative model registration system helps
reveal, for the first time, a normative theory of the law and economics of the
positive law patent-obtaining rules called the registration theory. The case for an
alternative model registration system also is helpful in showing why increased
scrutiny of patent applications would worsen, not improve, the present system’s
performance.
Some may argue that a full-blown shift to registration may not be optimal.
Indeed, the present patent system already has evolved some powerful disciplining
tools that restrict patents’ ability to cause many of the social costs that prompted
criticism. To the extent this effect should be increased, it may be beneficial to dial
back somewhat the presumption of validity and increase the patentee’s burdens of
conducting pre-filing investigations on both infringement and validity before
bringing suit to enforce a patent.
Finally, regardless of the prescriptive aspects of this Article, the new
normative registration theory for the patent-obtaining rules offered herein turns
out to have more explanatory power than the reward, prospect, and rent
dissipation theories in the literature. The registration theory thereby contributes to
the literature by both elucidating how and why these rules operate and by serving
as a new lens through which subsequent reforms can be judged

information was gathered from a survey conducted in the late summer of 2002 of senior
intellectual property managers at large companies and was sponsored by the Intellectual Property
Owners Association. This close correlation between the recommendations in the FTC report and
the results of the survey is consistent with the view that some leaders in the field think the agency
“got it right.” But this data does not speak to whether the agency “got it right” in the view of the
same people at a different time or other people situated differently, such as those who work in
small and medium-sized businesses, or those who endeavor to approach the issue without any
specific client with a present specific agenda in mind. I am grateful to Iain and Rebecca for
generously sharing the results of their data with me. Interview with Iain M. Cockburn, Professor
of Finance and Economics, Boston University School of Management, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 11,
2003).

